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UNSAFE HAWNS: THE CASE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FOSTER 
CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
Michael B. Mushlin* 
Introduction 
In a midwestern community not long ago, a one-year-old 
girl who required constant medical attention for epileptic sei- 
zures was sent by a state child welfare department to a foster 
home known by the state to be inadequate.' In fact, the case- 
worker assigned by the state to supervise the home had rec- 
ommended that the department not use this "marginal" setting 
except on a temporary, short-term basis. Children sent to this 
home in the past had been "ill clothed" and had not received 
attention for medical problems. The warning was ignored. When 
the child's caseworker reported that the foster parents were not 
bringing the child to her scheduled medical appointments, again 
the child welfare department did not respond. Finally, after two 
and one-half years and pressure from the child's physician, the 
child was removed from the foster home. By this time, the child, 
now three and one-half, had not received treatment for her 
epilepsy and was also experiencing other medical problems.* 
Even after an official finding of abuse by the state was registered 
against the home for its failure to care for this child, the state 
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1970, 
Northwestern University. 
I am grateful for the thoughtful editorial assistance and encouragement of Professor 
Donald L. Doernberg. I am also grateful for the assistance of Professors Norman B. 
Lichtenstein, M. Stuart Madden, David Rudenstine, Barbara Salken and Menil Sobie. 
I also wish to express my appreciation for the research assistance of Susan DeGeorge, 
Talay Hafiz, Shelley Halber and Laura Hunvitz. Finally, I am thankful for the support 
and encouragement of my wife, Thea Stone. 
G.L. v. Zurnwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (cited in D. Caplovitz & L. 
Genevie, Foster Children in Jackson County, Missouri: A Statistical Analysis of Files 
Maintained by The Division of Family Services 86-87, case 5.2 (July 21, 1982) (unpub- 
lished report)). 
The child was experiencing constant diarrhea and had not been toilet trained. In 
addition, she was so emotionally deprived that, although she was three and one-half, 
she had not been taught how to kiss. Id. at 87. 
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continued to use the foster home without interruption as a place- 
ment for abused and neglected children. 
In the same state, another foster child was assaulted while 
in foster care. The state knew of the attack, but did nothing. 
Within four months, the child was sexually abused by the foster 
father in the same home.3 In a third foster home, a four-year- 
old girl was whipped by her foster mother and made to stand 
with her hands extended over her head for thirty minutes. The 
child was being punished for being dirty. Although the case- 
worker determined that the child had been beaten, and reported 
this to her superiors, no action was taken and the child was 
returned to the home.4 
In another part of the country, a troubled young boy who 
wet his bed was placed in a foster home. The foster mother, 
frustratzd at her inability to control his behavior, sought help 
from the state's child welfare agency. Her pleas were ignored. 
The situation deteriorated until one night the foster mother 
forced the child to "drink his ~ r i n e . " ~  
None of these cases received public attention, nor were any 
of them the subject of reported court decisions or large damage 
awards. Each, however, is an example of the stark reality of 
life in foster homes6 for too many of the nation's half-million7 
Id. at 87, case 5.3. 
Id. at 89, case 5.6. 
5 Gil, Institutional Abuse of Children in Out-of-Home Care, 3 Child and Youth 
Services 7, 10 (1981). 
Foster family care is distinguished from institutional care and adoption in that 
"the foster family care is designed to be temporary and to offer the child care in a 
family setting." A. Kadushin, Child Welfare Services 425 (1967). In this Article, the 
term "foster care" is used to refer to foster family care arrangements. 
Once it is determined that a child can no longer remain in her original home, state 
law usually places the child in the custody of the state or local department of chid 
welfare. R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, Legal Rights of Children 358 (1984). The child 
welfare agency normally selects and licenses adults to serve as foster parents. Id. at 
361-65. The foster family then often enters into a contractual arrangement with the 
agency that requires the foster parents to care for the child under the direction and 
supervision of the agency. Id. A typical foster family is a middle-aged, working or lower- 
middle class family that owns its own home and has agreed to undertake the responsi- 
bility of foster care parenting out of either a need for extra cash or an altruistic desire 
to help needy children. Mnookin, Foster Care-Zn Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv. 
Educ. Rev. 599,610 (1973) [hereinafter Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?]; A. Gruber, 
Children in Foster Care: Destitute Neglected . . . Betrayed 151-74 (1978); T. Festinger, 
No One Ever Asked Us . . . A Postscript to Foster Care 270-71 (1983). 
7 For the years 1977 to 1983, estimates have varied from 273,913 to 502,000. T. 
Tatara, Cltaracteristics of Children in Substitute and Adoptive Care: A Statistical Sum- 
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foster children. This Article assesses constitutional rights of 
foster children to protection. In the last twenty-five years, the 
number of children in foster care has increased fi~efold.~ The 
foster care program now ranks with prisons, mental institutions 
and juvenile detention and treatment centers as a major state- 
operated custodial p r ~ g r a m . ~  
The Article argues that foster children have an equal, if not 
greater, claim to federal judicial protection from harm while in 
state care than do institutionalized persons who are already 
accorded significant  protection^.'^ Yet, in stark contrast to 
mary of the VCIS National Child Welfnre Data Base 30, table 2 (1985). In 1983, the 
latest year for which data are available, the American Public Welfare Association 
estimated that 447,000 children were served by the nation's foster care system. Id. at 
32, table 3. Of that number, sixty-nine and one-half percent were sent to foster family 
homes. Id. at 62. The remainder resided in group homes or institutions. Id. See also F. 
Kavaler & M. Swire, Foster-Child Health Care 1 (1983); Children's Defense Fund, 
Children Without Homes: An Examination of Public Responsibility to Children in Out- 
of-Home Care 2 (1978); Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Liti- 
gation After the Warren Years, 20 Fam. L.Q. 255, 275 (1986). 
Be~harov, Foster Care Reform: Two-Books for Practitioners (Book Review), 18 
Fam. L.Q. 247 (1984) [hereinafter Besharov, Foster Care Reform]. Three major reasons 
have been offered to explain the expansion in the use of foster care. R. Mnookin, In 
the Interest of Children 69 (1985) (decrease in use-of institutions for abandoned and 
neglected children) [hereinafter Mnookin, In the Interest]; Besharov, The Misuse of 
Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Func- 
tioning, 20 Fam. L.Q. 213,215 (1986) (increase in births to young single mothers unable 
to raise their children) [hereinafter Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care]; Besharov, 
Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 Fam. 
L.Q. 151, 153-55 (1983) (increase in child abuse and neglect reporting systems) [here- 
inafter Besharov, Child Protection]. Almost eight times as many children are reported 
to state officials as suspected victims of abuse or neglect than were reported in 1960. 
Id. at 151. Still, it is likely many children who ought to be in substitute care are not, 
either because their cases are not reported or because of the failure of the child welfare 
system to respond to legitimate pleas for protection of endangered children. Id. at 161 
(estimates 50,000 cases of observable injuries not reported in 1979). 
It is also likely, however, that some children go into foster care unnecessarily. 
Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7 at 15-18 (lack of family services). Mnookin, In 
Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6 ,  at 619-20 (vagueness of statutes permits class, 
race, and lifestyle biases to affect decisions). 
See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 174, chart 307 (107th ed. 1987) (503,601 state and federal prisoners). Id. 
at 171, chart 301 (223,551 held in jails). Id. at 100, chart 159 (220,700 mental health 
inpatients). Id. at 171, chart 299 (51,402 juveniles in public custody, 34,112 in private 
custody). Id. at 99, chart 158 (132,235 in-state facilities for the mentally retarded). 
Other commentators have surveyed problems in foster care. Two articles offer 
arguments for a foster child's right to safety. See Donella, Safe Foster Care: A Consti- 
tutional Mandate, 19 Fam. L.Q. 79 (1985); Comment, Child Abuse in Foster Homes: 
A Rationale for Pursuing Causes of Actions [sic] Against the Placement Agency, 28 St. 
Louis U.L.J. 975 (1984). Other articles have considered issues such as the standards 
for placement, the right of foster children and foster parents to remain together, and 
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scores of decrees entered to protect institutionalized persons 
from physical harm, there is but one reported federal case" that 
has enforced by injunctive decree a constitutional right of foster 
children to protection from harm while in foster care. 
The six sections of this Article present the case for direct 
federal court involvement in aiding foster children who are at 
risk of abuse and neglect while in foster care. Section I discusses 
the extent of abuse and neglect in foster care as well as the 
structural causes of this maltreatment. It also explains the in- 
evitable failure of the political branches of government to con- 
front the problem. Section I1 describes the constitutional right 
to safety and surveys the judicial treatment of that right, includ- 
ing the lack of development of the right for children in foster 
care. Section I11 discusses differences between children in foster 
family care and institutionalized persons, and argues that none 
of the differences can account for the failure to accord foster 
children the benefits of the right to safety. Section IV explores 
the appropriate remedy for the right to safety for foster children, 
and it demonstrates that damage remedies are inadequate be- 
cause their availability is severely circumscribed by a variety of 
immunity doctrines, and because even if they were available, 
monetary awards deflect attention from the root causes of abuse 
and neglect of foster children. This section presents the case for 
structural injunctions as the most practical remedy. 
the entitlement of foster children to permanence through either a prompt return home 
or adoption. See, e.g., Besharov, Tlze Misuse of Foster Care, supra note 8; Dobbs, 
Foster Care atrd Farnily Larv: A Look at Smith V. OFFER and the Constitutional Rights 
of Foster Clrildren and Their Families, 17 J. Fam. L. 1 (1979); Mnookin, In Whose Best 
Interest?, supra note 6; Musewicz, Tlze Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory 
Refortrr atrd tlre Clrild's Right to Permanence, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633 (1981); Wald, 
State Itrterventiotr orr Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Chil- 
dren frotrr tlrcir Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termi- 
rratiorr of Paretrtal Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976). 
1' G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (consent decree). A case 
is now pending in federal court that squarely presents the issue of whether or  not foster 
children are entitled to injunctive relief designed to vindicate their right to be protected 
from harm. L.J. v. Massinga, Civ. No. 84-4403 @. Md. filed Dec. 1984). On July 27, 
1987, a preliminary injunction was granted in that case. See infra note 169. The case 
now awaits final trial and disposition. In addition, a class action raising the issue of the 
constitutional right of foster children to safety is now pending before a state court. Janet 
T. v. Morse, S-359-86 WNM (Sup. Ct. Vt. filed Aug. 29, 1986). Thus, it seems likely 
that io the near future courts will be required to determine for the first time whether it 
is appropriate to assert jurisdiction to fashion structural injunctive decrees for the 
protection of foster children. 
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Section V discusses whether federal courts are the appro- 
priate forum to address the right to safety for foster children. 
Until the 196OYs, federal courts declined to become involved in 
cases involving custodial conditions because of a self-imposed 
abstention policy called the "hands-off" doctrine.12 Under that 
doctrine, courts deferred entirely to the judgments of adminis- 
trators.I3 The awakening of interest in the rights of the confined 
led to the erosion of that doctrine.14 In 1974, the Supreme Court 
announced definitively that the hands-off doctrine was inconsis- 
tent with constitutional principles, saying that "there is no iron 
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country."15 Since then, lower federal courts have almost rou- 
tinely intervened on behalf of the institutionalized, at least when 
necessary to protect against the most severe conditions of con- 
finement.16 Section V concludes that federal courts should also 
be the appropriate forum for foster care right-to-safety cases, 
and argues that none of the judicially created abstention doc- 
trines bar them. 
The final section of the Article proposes five basic guide- 
lines which, if followed, would maximize the potential effec- 
tiveness of district courts in making foster care safe. The Article 
concludes that federal judicial involvement offers the promise 
of benefitting children in foster care by materially improving a 
system that thus far has resisted reform. Without judicial scru- 
tiny, the abuse and neglect that many children suffered in their 
l2 See Comment, Beyond the Ken of Courts: A Critique of Judicial Reficsal to 
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963). See also infra notes 112- 
113 and accompanying text. 
l3 Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassess- 
ment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 31, 
56 (1985) (citing cases). 
l4 See, e.g., A. Neier, Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change 
170-71 (1982). 
l5 W O E  v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Professor Zeigler dates the 
demise of the hands-off doctrine a decade earlier, to Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 
(1964). See Zeigler, supra note 13. 
l6 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), modified srrb nom. 
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. 
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (prison); Morgan v. Sporat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 
1977) (iuvenile detention facility); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mental hospital); 
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 
1973) (institution for the mentally retarded); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 
(E.D. La. 1970) (prison). 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 203 1988 
204 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 23 
original homes will continue after the state places them in foster 
care. For these children, the temporary, substitute family sys- 
tem imposed on children in foster care by the state will not be 
a haven, but a hell. 
I. The Problem of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Home 
Placements 
Foster care is intended to provide a temporary, safe haven 
for children whose parents are unable to care for them." Too 
often, however, this purpose is not realized. Frequently, foster 
children are exposed to abuse and neglect by foster parents, 
and to serious injury due to the failure of the system itself to 
provide for stable care, or to attend to the children's medical 
problems. The failure of foster care programs to follow appro- 
priate minimum standards that would ensure the care and pro- 
tection of children has led to increased rates of foster care abuse 
and neglect. Despite the considerable costs, to both the children 
affected and to society generally, the political process has been 
unresponsive to calls for-reform of foster care iystems. 
A. Types ofAbuse and Neglect 
Whatever the reason for placement, foster children have 
not had a normal upbringing. By definition, the bonds to a foster 
child's permanent family have been disrupted. Foster children 
suffer disproportionately from serious emotional, medical and 
psychological disabilities.l8 To compound matters, it is well- 
established that they are at high risk of further maltreatment 
while in foster care.lg Foster children, therefore, are especially 
vulnerable individuals, prone to become victims unless special 
17 Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Services 8 (1975); 
Musewicz, supra note 10, at 637. 
l8  A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 182; D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 37, 
table 2.3; P. Ryan, Analyzing Abuse in Family Foster Care: Final Report 59 (1987). 
l 9  P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 59 and authorities cited therein; Vera Institute of 
Justice, Foster Home Child Protection 31-32 (Feb. 1981) (unpublished report) (Children 
who were abused in foster care were three times as likely to have entered foster care 
because of parental abuse than children who were not abused); D. Caplovitz & L. 
Genevie, supra note 1, at 100 (Children with several emotional, intellectual or physical 
difficulties tended to be at higher risk of abuse or neglect). 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 204 1988 
19881 Constitutional Protection of Foster Children 205 
care is taken to protect them. Two broad categories of mistreat- 
ment of these children have been identified. 
1. Foster Family Abuse and Neglect 
No one knows how many children are abused or neglected 
while in foster care,20 but the problem is more widespread than 
is currently acknowledged. Children in foster family care have 
been reported severely beaten21 and killed.22 In addition, cases 
in which children have been subjected to bizarre p~nishments~~ 
or parental neglect24 are common. 
Foster children seem peculiarly vulnerable to sexual abuse. 
This is a special problem because, by definition, there is no 
permanent kinship bond in foster care. As a result, the tradi- 
tional incest taboo does not operate.25 The lack of permanent 
tiesz6 combined with the cultural and class gaps that often exist 
between foster families and foster children, also can create an 
explosive environment in which expressions of verbal hostility 
often erupt.27 
While foster care has been frequently criticized for other 
reasons, some observers claim that, at the very least, children 
20 Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 43. See also P. Ryan & E. McFadden, 
National Foster Care Education Project: Preventing Abuse in Family Foster Care 11, 
14 (1986). 
21 Vera Institute of Justice. suora note 19. at 8-9 (use of belts. switches, electric 
cords, dog leashes, bread boards and broomsticks). 
. 
See Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (foster 
child beaten to death); D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 94-95, case 5.14 
(child killed by foster mother's boyfriend); Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 
v (foster child beaten to death by his foster mother). 
a B. Warren & G. Bardwell, G.L. v. Zum~valt, Case Record Monitoring, April 11, 
1983 through June 30, 1984: Final Report 52-54 (Apr. 24, 1985) (unpublished report on 
file with author) (children forced to stand in the center of a room for up to thirteen and 
one-half hours at a time, made to use a tin can for a toilet, locked in a basement, toilet- 
trained by being forced to stand with their pants over their heads); D. Caplovitz & L. 
Genevie, supra note 1, at 88, case 5.4. 
a D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 64 (children received only two meals 
a day and bitten by bedbugs); Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 13-14 (children 
smelled of "urine and vomit" and were "continually hungry"). 
25 P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 60. An additional factor accounting for the higher level 
of sexual abuse in foster care is that a large number of foster children were sexually 
abused in the past. Id. at 105. See also B. Warren & G. Bardwell, supra note 23, at 53- 
54, case 549. 
26 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
B. Warren & G. Bardwell, supra note 23, at 54, 64, cases 549, 536, 660 (citing 
cases in which foster parents have called their child a "dummy," said, "I feel sorry for 
you," and talked negatively about the chid's mother). 
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in foster care are protected from a high risk of abuse and neglect 
of the type just described.28 The evidence, however, does not 
bear out these hopes. One study reported that the rate of sub- 
stantiated abuse and neglect in New York City foster family 
care was more than one and one-half times that of children in 
the general p o p ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  A national survey of foster family 
abuse and neglect, completed in 1986 by the National Foster 
Care Education Project, revealed rates of abuse that, at their 
highest, were over ten times greater for foster children than for 
children in the general p o p ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  
As high as the reported rate is, a much higher level of abuse 
and neglect actually occurs than that officially reported. In 1979, 
a San Francisco group undertook a project to educate child 
welfare officials in a six-county area to discover unreported 
abuse occurring in foster care homes.31 Within a two-year pe- 
riod, seventy-five cases of either physical abuse and neglect or 
'8 See Mnookin, Itz Wlzose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 632. 
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 63-64 (49 abused children per 1,000 
in general population and 77 per 1,000 for children in foster family care). 
30 The number of complaints ranged from 3 per 1,000 homes to 67 per 1,000 homes. 
Substantiated abuse complaints ranged from 1.2 per 1,000 to 27 per 1,000. P. Ryan & 
E. McFadden, supra note 20, at 11. According to the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, the rate of maltreatment of children in 1978 for those 34 
states reporting on the subject was 2.55 per 1,000. Department of Health and Human 
Services, National Analysis of Official Child Neglect and Abuse Reporting 10-11, Table 
2 (1978). 
Unfortunately, the reported statistics on foster family abuse studies are not widely 
known. Comment, supra note 10, at 976 ("Statistics indicate that the percentage of 
abused children who suffer at the hands of foster parents is 'miniscule,' a mere 
0.3%. . . .") (quoting Note, Tlte Cltallenge of Cltild Abuse Cases: A Practical Approach, 
9 J .  Legis. 127, 139 (1982)). The statistic that only .3 percent of all reported abuse cases 
involve foster parents is not terribly illuminating for several reasons. First, it represents 
only the raw number of substantiated abuse cases involving foster children, without 
comparison to the number of foster parents generally. Therefore, it does not supply the 
relationship between the number of foster parents and those who are abusive, a figure 
that is relevant where, as here, one is interested in knowing the risk of abuse to any 
given foster child. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of American children are not 
cared for in foster homes. 
Second, the percentage does not disclose how many foster children were abused - 
by foster parents. Since multiple placements are not rare, see infra note 38 and accom- 
panying text, and since many foster homes are not closed despite reports of abuse and 
neglect, see supra notes 1, 5 and 8 and accompanying text, it is reasonable to assume 
that there is a greater than one-to-one relationship between abusing foster parents and 
abused foster children. 
Third, the report deals with only substantiated cases of foster parent abuse and 
neglect. This statistic does not include children who are harmed by "program" abuse. 
See it@ note 35 and accompanying text. 
3' Gil, supra note 5, at 8. 
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sexual abuse were reported from the area. In the past, "virtually 
no reports had been documented" through the official child 
abuse reporting system.32 Another study found that one state 
foster care agency neglected to report sixty-three percent of the 
cases of suspected child maltreatment to the central registry of 
child neglect, even though such reports were mandated by state 
law.33 
The actual amount of abuse and neglect may be much 
greater than anyone imagines. One study attempted to account 
for unreported or uninvestigated abuse and neglect in assessing 
the risk of abuse and neglect in foster boarding home care. The 
study concluded that forty-three percent of the children studied 
had been placed in an unsuitable foster home, and that fifty- 
seven percent of the children in the foster care system who were 
examined were at serious risk of harm while in foster care.34 
2. Program Abuse 
Another equally dangerous form of mistreatment results 
when the foster care system itself fails to provide children with 
a stable and secure home setting, or when it does not provide 
for the child's medical, psychological and emotional needs. This 
type of mistreatment has been termed "program abuse."35 
a. Stability of Care 
Children entering foster care placement inevitably experi- 
ence the pain of separation from their family setting no matter 
how inadequate that setting has been.36 The substitute experi- 
3Z Id. at 8-9. 
33 D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 83-84, table 5.1. The study also 
reported that in over forty percent of the cases, the agency did not so much as undertake 
an internal investigation to determine whether or not the suspicion of abuse reported 
by its own caseworker was true. Id. at 84-85. A follow-up study three years later 
revealed that the same agency failed to report, for external investigation, seventy-four 
percent of the suspected incidents of child mistreatment in the sample group. B. Warren 
& G. BardweIl, supra note 23, at 50-51, chart 3. 
" D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 59-69,82-98. The study based these 
calculations upon an examination of over 800 case records maintained for 194 randomly 
selected foster children placed in care within a five year period prior to March of 1981. 
Id. at 96. 
35 Gi, supra note 5, at 10. 
= Id. 
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ence created in its place compounds that trauma if it does not 
provide a stable home en~ironment .~~ Unfortunately, foster 
home placements are frequently extremely unstable. Often fos- 
ter children are shuffled from home to home without any op- 
portunity to form an attachment with an adult caretaker. Stays 
in four or more foster homes are common.38 Aside from the 
trauma entailed by this movement, the likelihood that the child 
will be abused at some time during his stay increases with each 
b. Medical Care 
As the substitute parent, the child welfare program assumes 
responsibility for the child's medical and psychological care.40 
All children need medical care, but the need is acute for foster 
children who are less healthy than any other identifiable group 
of youngsters in the United States.41 The provision of treatment 
cannot await the end of a foster care placement. 
Nevertheless, medical care systems for foster children are 
inadequate "to manage effectively even simple and common 
child health problems."42 For example, a comprehensive study 
of the medical status of foster children found that many of the 
pre-school age foster children studied had not received vacci- 
nations for the prevention of childhood diseases.43 Fourteen 
percent had received no medical examination upon admission 
to foster care, and the average physical exam was in~omple te .~~ 
Forty-seven percent of the children had visual problems that 
37 D. Fanshel & E. Shinn, Children in Foster Care: A Longitudinal Investigation 
137 (1978). 
J8 See D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 20-24; Children's Defense Fund, 
supra note 7, at 41; A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 67-68. 
39 See, e.g., Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at vi (reporting that twenty- 
eight percent of victims of foster family abuse had been in three or more foster homes 
as compared to only thirteen percent of foster children generally). 
+I Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 5 3.10. 
F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7. The authors undertook an extensive 
independent evaluation of the physical condition of 668 New York City foster children. 
See also A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 73 (Massachusetts); D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, 
, supra note 1, at 35-37 (Kansas City). 
42 F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 149. 
Id. at 143. These findings have been confirmed. See, e.g., D. Caplovitz & L. 
Genevie, supra note 1, at 41-43. 
" F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 142. 
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had not been evaluated by an optometri~t .~~ Over forty percent 
needed dental care but had not been to a dentist.46 Only one- 
fourth of the children who had identifiable emotional or devel- 
opmental problems had received treatment.47 When children had 
received medical attention, it often was inadequate. For exam- 
ple, sixty-one percent of the children who received glasses were 
given inadequate  prescription^.^^ Based upon these data the 
aut!mrs concluded that "[tlhe system for providing health care 
to foster children is woefully inadequate both in New York State 
and in the country."49 
In light of the high level of both foster family abuse and 
neglect and program abuse, "[tlhe assumption that a child is 
removed from an abusive or neglectful home and placed in a 
safe environment can no longer be taken at face value. . . . "50 
Indeed, the threat of abuse and neglect of children in foster 
family care must be considered to be "acute and wide~pread."~' 
Given the state's responsibility to these children, this situation 
is inexcu~able.~~ 
B. The Causes and Costs of Maltreatment 
Although all of the facets of abuse and neglect of foster 
children have not been examined, enough is known to dispel 
notions that foster care maltreatment is inevitable or that re- 
sponsibility for maltreatment rests entirely with foster parents. 
Instead, there is a growing body of evidence that links foster 
family abuse and neglect to the state child welfare agencies that 
fail to meet minimum professional standards.53 Such standards 
45 Id. at 146. 
46 Id. 
47 See also D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1,  at 38; A. Gruber, supra note 
6, at 89, 183. 
" F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 146. 
49 Id. at 185. See also Shor, Health Care Supervision of Foster Children, LX Child 
Welfare 313,318 (1981) (Maryland foster care agencies). 
Gil, supra note 5, at 8. 
51 P. Ryan & E. McFadden, supra note 20, at 14. 
52 See also Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 64. 
" See Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17; American Public Welfare 
Association, Standards for Foster Family Systems for Public Agencies (1975). See also 
Cavara & Ogran, Protocol to Investigate Child Abuse in Foster Care, 7 Chid Abuse 
and Neglect 287, 293 (1983); P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 7; Vera Institute of Justice, 
supra note 19, at 33-34. 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 209 1988 
210 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 23 
require the careful screening and licensing of potential foster 
care  applicant^,^^ training of those who are chosen for the 
careful matching of foster children with foster parents,s6 and 
regular, continual supervision by competent caseworke~-s57 of 
the foster care p l a ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  Supervision by trained caseworkers 
fulfills two crucial functions. First, it allows the agency to meet 
its "obligation to ascertain whether the child is receiving care 
in accordance with accepted standards, and in relation to his 
needs."59 Second, supervision promotes the competence of fos- 
ter parents by relieving anxieties aroused by the child's behav- 
ior, increasing understanding of the child by supplying infor- 
mation and promptly providing supportive help. Training, 
casework support and consultation with s ~ c i a l  workers are often 
esential for foster parents to understand and guide foster chil- 
dren. Absent these forms of state back-up, foster parents can 
find the behavior of foster children "baffling or inexplicable," or 
may feel they are in an endless "struggle for control."60 Profes- 
sional standards also provide for the elimination of foster home 
54 See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 55-56; Child 
Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at § 4.16; Vera Institute of Justice, supra 
note 19, at 33. J' Foster children are not easy to handle, because often they have been sexually or 
physically abused in the past. They present their caretakers with patterns of behavior 
that are extremely upsetting and provocative to persons not prepared to cope with them. 
Compliance with professionally recognized standards would require the availability of 
training programs for foster parents. Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, 
at § 4.4. See also American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 64; P. Ryan, 
srtpra note 18, at 99-100, 105, recommendations 2, 15; Vera Institute of Justice, supra 
note 19, at 33-36. 
J6 The failure of a foster care agency seriously to consider prior to placement 
whether a particular child should live with a particular set of foster parents is often the 
direct cause of the maltreatment of foster children. Child Welfare League of America, 
supra note 17, at 5 3.9. See also Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
s7 See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 64; Child 
Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at § 4.4; P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 105-06, 
recommendations 17-19; Vera Institute of Justice, Protection of Children in Foster 
Family Care: A Guide for Social Workers (March 10, 1982) (unpublished article); P. 
Ryan, supra note 18, at 3. 
Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 3 4.27. The Child Welfare 
League standards require that the agency maintain personal contact with the child once 
a month for the first year, after which personal contact every other month may be 
sufficient. Id. at 3 4.28. Regular supervision is also stressed in the literature of foster 
family abuse and neglect. See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note 
53, at 65; P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 103, recommendation 11; Vera Institute of Justice, 
srtpra note 19, at 39-42. 
59 Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 1 4.27. 
60 P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 59-60. 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 210 1988 
19881 Constitutional Protection of Foster Children 21 1 
over~rowding,~~ strict bans on improper p~nishment ,~~ and
prompt referrals for outside investigation of all suspicions of 
maltreatment by foster parents.63 
Failure to follow professional standards results in increased 
foster family abuse and neglect. One study connected the lack 
of training of foster parents, foster home overcrowding, the 
failure to match foster children with appropriate parents and the 
failure to  visit foster homes regularly with the abuse of f s t e r  
children.64 Another study linked the failure to refer allegations 
of abuse and neglect to the proper authorities for investigation 
and the failure to follow up on suspicions of abuse with the 
continuation of foster child abuse.'j5 
These failures of the foster care system, and the corre- 
sponding abuse and neglect of foster children, have a serious, 
detrimental effect on society. Injuries inflicted upon foster chil- 
dren will not heal easily since often the abused foster children 
have already been harmed in their permanent homes.66 Society 
has a humanitarian interest in the prevention of such unneces- 
sary suffering, and a strong utilitarian interest in reducing crime 
and dependency. A negative foster care experience does little 
to advance these interests; indeed, it contributes to later anti- 
social and dependent beha~ior.~' Then-Justice Rehnquist de- 
scribed the significance to society of protecting children from 
61 Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 8 4.7. 
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 57, at 17-20 (Condoning corporal punishment 
raises the risk of severe injury to foster children. In addition, foster children are more 
likely to interpret physical punishment as rejection which, in turn, reinforces their poor 
self image.). 
Gi, supra note 5, at 8. See also P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 107-08, recommen- 
dation 22. 
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 2. 
Gil, supra note 5, at 9. See also Office of the City Council President, The Foster 
Care Pyramid: Factors Associated with the Abuse and Neglect of Children in Foster 
Boarding Homes 2, 53-55, 60-64, 69-73 (1982) (study found that inadequate home 
studies, reference checks and procedures to decertify deficient foster homes correlated 
with abuse and neglect). 
66 Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 57, at 5-7 (citing J. Segal, Child Abuse: A 
Review of Research Families Today 1 (1979)). See also Comment, supra note 10, at 979 
(and authorities cited therein). 
67 R. Flowers, Children and Criminality 101 (1986) (and authorities cited therein); 
D. Gurak, Center for Policy Research, Foster Care Experience Among Incarcerated 
Adults 19 (June 1977) (unpublished report). By contrast, there is evidence that foster 
children who have had a satisfactory experience in foster care fare as well as children 
in the general population. T. Festinger, supra note 6, at 199-209. 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 211 1988 
212 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 23 
abuse: "[Clhildren who are abused in their youth generally face 
extraordinary problems developing into responsible productive 
citizens. . . . Few could doubt that the most valuable resource 
of a self-governing society is its population of children who will 
one day become adults and themselves assume the responsibility 
of self-g~vernance."~~ Nevertheless, the legislative and execu- 
tive branches of government have not responded to calls for 
foster care reform. 
C.  The Failure of Reform: Legislative and Executive Default 
Although severe deficiencies in the foster care system have 
been spotlighted almost from its start,69 the American foster 
care system has developed a remarkable immunity to reform. It 
has been the subject of studies at the state and national level,70 
yet little appreciable improvement has resulted. In 1979, the 
president of the Children's Defense Fund, Marian Wright Edel- 
man, concluded that the conditions in the foster care system of 
the United States remained a "national di~grace."~' In the same 
year, the National Commission on Children in Need of  parent^,^^ 
issued its unanimous verdict that "[wlith some admirable ex- 
ceptions, the foster care system in America is an unconscionable 
failure, harming large numbers of the children it purports to 
serve."73 While these condemnations concern the full gamut of 
issues posed by the administration of foster care, the specific 
issue of abuse and neglect of foster children in foster family 
placements has not been o ~ e r l o o k e d . ~ ~  
It is not difficult to understand why the American foster 
care system has been so roundly criticized. Foster care systems 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789-90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
69 See, e.g., A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 9 (1930 White House conference marking 
establishment of national foster care program); A. Kadushin, supra note 6, at 411 (citing 
Lewis, Long-Time and Temporary Placement of Children in Selected Papers in Case- 
work 40 (1951) (by the 1950's foster care was failing to fulfill its purpose)); H. Mass & 
R. Engler, Jr., Children in Need of Parents (1959). 
70 Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7; National Commission of Children in 
Need Of Parents, Who Knows? Who Cares? Forgotten Children in Foster Care (1979); 
A. Gruber, srrpra note 6 (Massachusetts foster care system). 
7l Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at xiii. 
n National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 4. 
73 Id. at 5. 
74 See supra notes 21-27, 29, 31-34, 64-65 and accompanying text. But see supra 
notes 28,30 and accompanying text. 
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are administered by staffs that are "overburdened, poorly paid 
and often unprepared profe~sionally"~~ for the difficult work they 
are called upon to perform. Lack of financial support has led to 
a system that is poorly organized and usually lacks even the 
most basic information about its own operation.76 Foster parents 
as well receive inadequate financial and professional support. 
Payments offered to foster parents are often less than the cost 
of caring for the basic needs of the child; inadequacy of these 
payments adds financial stress to the burdens of being a foster 
parent.77 Funding is especially important if foster care place- 
ments are to be made safe. Money is needed for additional 
trained social workers to screen carefully and regularly super- 
vise foster homes, to train foster parents and to ensure that an 
adequate number of foster parents are available to avoid over- 
loading foster homes with more children than they can handle.78 
Funds must also be allocated to hire medical personnel to su- 
pervise and implement a decent medical care system.79 Abuse 
of children who come under the state's care for protection is 
the "inevitable result of inadequate funding."80 Without addi- 
tional aid, it would be almost impossible for change to occur 
even if there were a commitment to it by people in the system. 
One must ask why foster care is "least favored by the 
legislat~re."~~ Here, too, the answer is not difficult to discern. 
Foster care is a service almost always reserved for the children 
of the poor,82 and, in most states, foster care is disproportion- 
ately used by minority childrens3 who, not unexpectedly, have 
encountered discrimination in the foster care system.84 The dis- 
75 National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 6. 
76 Lowry, supra note 7, at 257. 
National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 21. See 
also A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 172. 
See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. 
Besharov, Protecting Children from Abuse: Should It Be a Legal Duty?, 11 U .  
Dayton L. Rev. 509,546 (1986). 
Lowry, supra note 7, at 274. 
sz Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 607 and sources cited therein; 
F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 47. See Lowry, supra note 7, at 257. 
83 National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 25. 
Accord, Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 49-52; Lowry, supra note 7, at 257; 
Dobbs, supra note 10, at 4. 
" See, e.g., Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Security, 400 F. Supp. 249, 
255 (M.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding black children in the 
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parate treatment of minorities also appears to mean that they 
run an even greater risk of abuse and neglect in foster care than 
other foster children.85 While other parents experiencing diffi- 
culties with child rearing can rely on private school and paid 
professional support, the poor and the underclass must resort 
to their local child welfare agency. 
It is difficult to imagine a more powerless group of people 
than foster children. They are largely unrepresented in the court 
proceedings that lead to their p l a ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  Living without the 
protection of their parents, they are completely at the mercy of 
the persons who may also be responsible for maltreating them.87 
They do not vote; they lack the developmental ability to orga- 
nize. Their voices, assuming they are old enough to speak, 
cannot be heard. Whatever happens to them, therefore, happens 
outside of the zone of public scrutiny. 
The pressure that exists for improvements in foster care 
systems focuses on issues other than maltreatment. Supporters 
of foster care reform, responding either to the concerns of nat- 
ural parents, or to those of foster parents concerned about 
adoption, have concentrated on the states' over-reliance on fos- 
ter care rather than on the issue of safety within the foster care 
system. Natural parents and their advocates have exerted pres- 
sure for preventive services that would limit the need for foster 
care by requiring the state to aid families in distress before 
taking a child away.88 These services can include day care, 
homemaker services, parent training, transportation, clinical 
services and assistance in obtaining housing.89 Advocates of 
Alabama foster care system were not given equal treatment in referrals to specialized 
placements); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree 
designed to ensure that all children, regardless of race or religion, are served by the 
New York City foster care system on a "first come-first served" basis). See also 
Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 49-54. 
S5 D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 99-100, table 5.5 (black children are 
more likely to be abused or neglected in foster care). 
" See R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, supra note 6, at 296-99, $7.17, 368, $ 9.06 
(Foster children usually have no voice in voluntary placements. There are minimal or 
no procedural rights at periodic review proceedings.). 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text, and infra notes 203-04 and accom- 
panying text. 
Wiltse, Current Issues and New Directions in Foster Care, in Child Welfare 
Strategy in the Coming Years 67 (A. Kadushin ed. 1978); Stein, An Overview of Services 
to Farr~ilies arld Clrildren in Foster Care, in Foster Children in the Courts 420 (M. 
Hardin ed. 1983). 
ss See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, 8 423.2 (1987). 
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adoption have called for "permanency planning" designed to 
speed children though foster care by promptly returning them 
to their original homes, or, if that is not practicable, by termi- 
nating parental rights and placing the child for adoption.g0 
Yet even if these reforms are s u c ~ e s s f u l ~ ~  "there will al- 
ways be some children-the orphans, the abandoned, and the 
severely abused-for whom substitute care outside of their 
homes will be necessa~y."~~ Cmliiisns for preventive services 
and permanency planning have not addressed the issue of mal- 
treatment of foster children, perhaps because they would not 
be the direct beneficiaries of such reform. Without an ally who 
will materially or politically gain from the change, the plea for 
protection of those children who will end up in foster care will 
remain no more than a soft whisper. Whether the courts should 
fill this void must now be considered. 
D. The Call for Judicial Involvement 
Courts would provide a great benefit to society were they 
to become involved in foster care reform both by preventing 
the indignity of abuse and by protecting foster children's fu- 
Maluccio & Fein, Permanency Planning: A Redefinition, 62 Child Welfare 195, 
197 (1983). The call for permanency planning from the legal and social work communities 
has been loud and persistent. See, e.g., Christoff, Children in Limbo In Ohio: Perma- 
nency Planning and the State of the Law, 16 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1 (1986) and sources cited 
therein; New York Task Force on Permanency Planning for Children in Foster Care, 
Permanency Planning: A Shared Responsibility (March 1986); Mnookin, In Whose Best 
Interest?, supra note 6, at 633-35. 
91 Advocates who have called for child welfare reforms in the areas of preventive 
services and permanency planning have begun to obtain at least some legislative results. 
In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,94 Stat. 500 (provides financial incentives to encourage states 
to strengthen preventive services and permanency planning). See 42 U.S.C. § 675. For 
a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the Act, see Allen, Golubock & Olson, 
A Guide to The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act of 1980 in Foster 
Children in the Courts 577 (M. Hardin ed. 1983). 
Legislative reform focusing on the promotion of a permanent family bond has also 
taken place at the state level. In 1976, California passed the Family Protection Act, 
S.B. 30, 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. 977 (West), and in 1979, New York passed the Child 
Welfare Reform Act of 1979, 1979 N.Y. Laws 610, 611. See A. English, Foster Care 
Reform, Strategies for Legal Services Advocates to Reduce the Need for Foster Care 
and Improve the Foster Care System 83-97 (1981). 
92 A. English, supra note 91, at 4. 
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t ~ r e s . ~ ~  Yet, federal courts are understandably reluctant to be- 
come involvedg4 in protracted endeavors, such as would be 
required in large scale institutional reform of this kind, unless 
they perceive that the need to do so is great. Some have argued 
that federal courts should not intervene in such matters unless 
intervention is necessary to protect the rights of "discrete and 
insular" minoritiesg5 who lack access to the normal political 
process.96 As one commentator put it: "The judicial obligation 
to enforce the rights of the politically powerless is at the heart 
of the American political system."97 Expressed differently, fed- 
eral judicial intervention is appropriate when important consti- 
tutional rights are implicated, when the institution itself has 
proven resistant to change through more traditional legislative 
or executive means, and where the change requested is "critical 
to the quality of American life."98 The case for the exercise of 
judicial discretion to ensure protection of foster children is com- 
pelling under any of these formulations. 
As discussed below, the right to protection occupies a crit- 
ical niche in our system of government; it has historic roots in 
our philosophical conception of the fundamental role and justi- 
fication for government's existence.99 If any group in society is 
denied the right to protection, it is difficult to imagine how it 
can enjoy any other right. Yet, foster children are powerless to 
obtain the right for themselves.100 Involvement by the federal 
93 T. Festinger, supra note 6, at 262-64. See also Besharov, The Misuse of Foster 
Care, supra note 8, at 218-19, (quoting M. Wald, Protecting Abuserneglected Children: 
A Comparison of Home and Foster Care Placement 12-13 (1985)). 
The power of a federal court to grant affirmative relief is discretionary. Comment, 
Cotlfrontit~g the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison 
Reform, 12 Haw. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 367, 385-86 (1977); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978). See generally D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 108-11 (1973). 
93 The term "discrete and insular minorities" was first used by Chief Justice Stone 
in his now famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938), to describe those groups that most require judicial protection in order to 
enjoy their constitutional rights. See also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-179 (1980); 
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of  Minorities. 91 Yale L.J. 
- 
1287 (i982). 
% See J .  Ely, supra note 95, at 135-36; R. Mnookin, In The Interest, supra note 8, 
at 37-41; Swygert, It1 Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 Val. U.L. Rev. 439,443 (1982). 
97 Comment, supra note 94, at 386. 
95 Zeigler, supra note 13, at 39. 
99 See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historic 
roots of the right to safety. 
Professor Mnookin has observed that children as a group may not qualify for 
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courts in advancing the right to protection is thus consistent 
with the notion of the limited intervention of the federal 
judiciary. 
An additional motivation justifying judicial involvement in 
foster care reform is the long history of solicitude to the needs 
of children. Children, because of their obvious dependency, 
need special protection.lo1 As long ago as 1944,1°2 the Supreme 
Court recognized the state's strong interest in safeguarding chil- 
dren from abuse.lo3 This interest is reflected in a virtually un- 
broken line of Supreme Court opinions upholding state actions 
that might otherwise have been unconstitutional, but that were 
saved by the need to protect children.lW 
Having examined the nature and scope of the problem, the 
foster care system's resistance to change through the legislature 
or the executive, and the consistency of judicial involvement in 
foster care reform with principles of judicial intervention, the 
next section examines which substantive rights justify judicial 
involvement. 
11. The Constitutional Right to Safety 
In 1982, a unanimous court in Youngberg v. Romeo held 
that the state owes an "unquestioned duty" to provide reason- 
able safety for all residents of a state institution for the mentally 
special protection as a discrete and insular minority because of the "multitude of 
potential and part-time spokesmen [sic] for children." Mnookin, In The Interest, supra 
note 8, at 41. Whatever may be said of children generally, however, foster children are 
a discrete and insular minority, especially where a claim for which they have no obvious 
allies is concerned. 
Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8, at 31. 
lrn Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
'03 Id .  at 168-69 (upholding law that prohibited children from selling magazines in 
. - - 
a public place). 
lar New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding New York law prohibiting 
knowing promotion of sexual performance by  childien even if it is not obscene); H.L. 
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding notification and consultation baniers to 
the exercise of the right to an abortion for an immature minor which would be uncon- 
stitutional if applied to an adult); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, reh'g denied, 
391 U.S. 971 (1968) (upholding criminal statute prohibiting sale to minors of material 
that would not be obscene if sold to adults). 
Taken together, these decisions establish a right unique to children to be protected 
from "endangering surroundings and influences." S. Davis & M. Schwartz, Children's 
Rights and the Law 73 (1987). 
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retarded.lo5 Unquestioned though the right may be, recognition 
of its existence developed quite slowly and it continues to lack 
clear standards defining its scope. Nevertheless, the right to 
safety has deep roots in American legal and philosophical 
thought. This section briefly traces the origin of the right, its 
development in lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court, 
and provides a brief comment on the standards that courts have 
used to determine whether or not the right has been violated, 
and concludes with a discussion of the application of the right 
to foster children. 
A. The Development of the Right to Safety 
1. The Origin of the Right 
The right to safety for the institutionalized invoked by Jus- 
tice Powell in Youngberg can be traced as far back as Black- 
stone, Cooke and Hobbes-progenitors of modern American 
law-all of whom recognized that the first function of govern- 
ment is protection of the governed. In Leviathan, Hobbes' sem- 
inal seventeenth century work, Hobbes asserted that govern- 
ment's primary purpose and responsibility is protection. This is 
so, he wrote, because men live under governments for their own 
preservation.lo6 In Calvin's Case,Io7 Cooke, Chief Justice of the 
King's Bench, explained the basic terms of the modern social 
compact: in exchange for "true and faithful ligeance" the gov- 
ernment undertakes the duty of p ro t ec t i~n . ' ~~  And Blackstone 
ranked the "right to personal security" as the primary right each 
citizen possesses.10g The right to personal security "consists in 
. . . uninterrupted enjoyment of . . . life . . . limbs . . . body 
. . . health, and . . . reputation."l1° 
Io5 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). While there were two concurrences in addition to the 
majority opinion in Yolingberg, the Court did not divide on this issue. See infia text 
accompanying note 145. 
'06 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (1651). 
Io7 [I6081 4 Co. Rep. 1 (K.B.). 
Io3 Id. at 4b. 
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 129. 
l tO Id. at 300. This conception of the centrality of the right of protection has not 
changed in modern times. In 1918, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes authored an article 
identifying four conditions that make up the "necessary elements in any society." O.W. 
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2. The Early Prison Cases 
Despite its deep jurisprudential underpinnings, the right to 
safety has been recognized only recently as an enforceable con- 
stitutional right of the institutionalized. Although the Sixth Cir- 
cuit suggested that the government had a duty to protect pris- 
oners from assault or injury,"' as late as 1944, the hands-off 
doctrine effectively precluded Etigation to enforce this right.li2 
The hands-off doctrine was a judicially created concept that 
commanded federal courts to abstain from examining prison 
matters,l13 as prisons were considered the exclusive domain of 
the Congress and of the state governments.l14 
By the late 1960's and early 1 9 7 0 ' ~ ~  however, federal courts, 
responding to the Supreme Court's receptive approach to civil 
rights cases, slowly began to lower the barrier to judicial review 
of institutional conditions. During that time period, several 
courts held that inmates have an eighth amendment right to be 
protected from harm.u5 The eighth amendment's "evolving stan- 
Holmes, Natural Law, in Collected Legal Papers 310, 312 (1920). The most important 
of these, in Holmes' view, was "some protection for the person." Id. In Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Justice White stated that "[tlhe most basic function of 
any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property." Id. 
at 539 (White, J., dissenting). In a report to the American Bar Association in 1981, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger identified "protection and security" as a "theme [that] runs 
throughout all history." W. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association 2 
(Feb. 8, 1981) reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 290 (1981). For a thorough account of the 
historic underpinnings of the right to safety and its roots, see Willing, Protection by 
Law Enforcement: The Emerging Constitutional Right, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 22-54 
- - - - 
(1982). 
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). 
11* The hands-off doctrine was invoked even where inmates' safety was at stake. 
Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 287,290 @. Alaska 1951) (The complaint alleged 
that the facility was overcrowded and unsanitary, and that given the locked exits, a coal 
stove presented an inescapable situation in the event of a fire. The court considered 
conditions a "fabulous obscenity" but dismissed the complaint.). 
Two recent cases dealing with the right to safety in penal facilities may foreshadow 
a return to considering such complaints non-justiciable. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 
U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), discussed infra note 153. 
Comment, supra note 10, at 507. The pull of the doctrine was so strong that 
even claims of racial discrimination were not cognizable. See United States ex rel. 
Monis v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953). See also Note, Consti- 
tutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 985 (1962). 
114 See. e z . .  Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 19541, cert. denied, 348 
- - .  
U.S. 859 (i954.. 
See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of a strap to beat 
prisoners as a disciplinary measure violated the eighth amendment's proscription against 
cruel and unusual punishment). See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 
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dards of decency" were violated when prison officials failed to 
manage their system in a way which minimized the high risk of 
violence in the prison. The standards for application under the 
eighth amendment varied: some courts based relief from unsafe 
prison conditions on a visceral "shocking to the conscience" 
test;u6 others based their interpretations on the observation that 
the state must exercise ordinary .care in the custody of 
prisoners. '17 
In 1974, Justice White sounded the Supreme Court's death 
knell to the "hands-off" doctrine in a single line: "[Tlhere is no 
Iron Curtain between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
c o ~ n t r y . " ~ ~  With the demise of the "hands-off" doctrine, lower 
courts were free to consider right-to-safety cases without juris- 
dictional hindrance. As time passed, lower courts established 
that the right to safety followed an inmate into prison. Those 
decisions explain that the right protects inmates not only from 
deliberate abuse by their keepers, but also from conditions 
which make inmates open to violence by their fellow inmates.ug 
1970), Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889,890 (4th Cir. 1973) (standards for adjudicating 
the right to safety in a prison context: "(1) whether there is a pervasive risk of harm to 
inmates from other prisoners, and, if so, (2) whether the officials are exercising reason- 
able care to prevent prisoners from intentionally harming others or from creating an 
unreasonable risk of harm."). 
If6 Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. 
Supp. 362,380 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
!I7 Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This theory is 
derived from common law doctrine that places a duty upon prison officials to provide 
for the protection of prisoners who are placed in their charge. See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 9 20 (1965); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts 1048 (5th ed. 1984). In Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court similarly found that prison authorities have a 
constitutional duty to provide prisoners with medical care: "[Dleliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain."' Id. at 104, (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Several 
lower federal courts have utilized this theory as a basis for affording prisoners relief - 
from rampant prison violence. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1122 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1982). 
!I8 \%Iff V. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1973). 
!I9 See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Little v. Walker, 
552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). 
Extensive relief has been granted, effectuating that right. Among the types of relief 
ordered are (a) increases in staff, see, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 
1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a r d  in part and rev'd in 
part, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 
1981), aff 'd in part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982); (b) improvements 
to staff training programs, see, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1128 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1982); and (c) classification of inmates by dangerousness, see, e.g., Jones v. 
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3. The Right in Other Institutional Settings 
While the right to safety was fist  articulated in the context 
of prisons, and has been most fully developed there, it has been 
implemented in other institutional settings as well. In 1973, a 
federal district court held that a class of residents of the Willow- 
brook State School for the Me11taliy Retarded had the right "to 
reasonable protection from harm."120 The court distinguished 
this right to safety from a right to treatment, which it declined 
to recognize. Courts since have followed the Willowbrook de- 
cision, applying it in other institutionalized settings as well. It 
is now firmly established that the mentally ill and retarded,121 
residents of state juvenile training suspects in police 
and pretrial detainees124 have a constitutional right to 
protection. 
Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 
1060 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 
In some cases, in order to ensure the right to protection, courts have ordered 
modifications to the structure of an institution or, if necessary, that the institution, or 
some part of it, be closed. See, e-g., Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978); 
Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984 @. Or. 1983) (court ordered progress reports on 
renovations and their impact on violative conditions); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. 
Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
See also Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from Zn- 
mate Violence, 35 Drake L. Rev. 101 (1985-86); Plotkin, Serving Justice: Prisoners' 
Rights to be Free From Physical Assault, 23 Clev. St. L. Rev. 387 (1974); Note, Inmate 
Assaults and Section I983 Damage Claims, 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 596 (1977). 
I2O New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. 
Supp. 752, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See New York Association for Retarded Children v. 
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (consent decree encompassing protection from 
harm caused by physical injury as well as from conditions causing the deterioration, or 
preventing the development, of an individual's capacities), modification denied, 551 F. 
Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), a r d  in part and rev'd in part, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983). 
See also D. Rothman & S. Rothman, The Willowbrook Wars (1984). 
I2l See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 
(2d Cir. 1984); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 @.N.D. 
1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 @. Minn. 
4th Div. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 
19771~ 
--. ., - 
In Santana'v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), modified, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 
419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1983); Martarella v. 
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,245 (1983). 
Iz4 Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
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As in prison cases, the right is most frequently implemented 
by courts in class action suits seeking injunctive relief, rather 
than in individual suits for damages where the plaintiff's claim 
often founders on one or more of the various immunity doc- 
t r i n e ~ . ' ~ ~  The injunctive relief that has been granted has provided 
significant reforms in several institutional contexts. Courts have 
ordered institutions for the mentally retarded or ill to make 
structural i rnpr~vements , '~~ decrease their population,127 hire 
more staff,128 institute staff training pr~gramsl*~ and provide 
training of residents.I3O In pretrial detention decisions, courts 
have been willing to close jails where deemed necessary to 
ensure safety.I3' 
Since the eighth amendment does not apply outside the 
context of prison,'32 courts have relied on different theories to 
support the right to safety for those in non-penal institutions. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is most 
frequently invoked. For confinement to meet constitutional stan- 
I U  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (The Court rejected the 
previous standard which permitted a finding of liability based on proof that the official 
acted in bad faith. Instead, the Court held that the individual must prove that her clearly 
established constitutional right was violated by the defendant). Given the uncertainty 
as to the standard governing the right to safety, see infra notes 149-153 and accom- 
panying text, this is a difficult burden indeed. Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1st 
Cir. 1976). BIII see Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442 @. Del. 1985) (official immunity 
denied where officials at state mental hospital violated the well-known constitutional 
right to a safe environment for those involuntarily committed to mental institutions). 
Iz6 Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 132 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (physical improvements 
in the facility to provide an appropriate environment for the mentally retarded). 
Iz7 Woe v. Cuomo, 638 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining additional 
patients from being admitted to the Bronx Psychiatric Center); New York State Ass'n 
for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715,717 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (requiring sharp 
reduction in the population of Willowbrook to a capacity of 250 beds or less). 
Iz8 See, e.g., New York State Association For Retarded Children v. Rockefeller 
357 F. Supp. 752, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
Iz9 Id. at 768 (consent decree increased stafling and training provision). See also 
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 133-34 (N.D. Ohio 1979). 
Iy0 In the Willowbrook case, the consent decree mandated individually designed 
instruction for residents. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 596 
F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1979) (programs to include education, physical therapy, speech 
pathology and audiology services). See also Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 
561 F. Supp. 473, 494 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd,  713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). 
I3l See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Inmates of 
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 689-90 @. Mass. 1973) (Charles 
Street Jail deemed unfit by failing to meet a standard of "basic humanity toward men" 
and ordered replaced). 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (the eighth amendment was "de- 
signed to protect those convicted of crimes"). 
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dards, the conditions of confinement must bear some relation- 
ship to its purpose.133 If, as in the case of the mentally ill, 
confinement is to treat and protect, the deprivation of liberty 
lacks constitutional support when it fails to advance those 
purposes. 134 
4.  The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Right to Safety 
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a prison case 
in which it awarded relief which focused directly on the right to 
safety,135 it has endorsed lower court orders that provided affir- 
mative relief on that ground. In Bell v. W ~ l J i s h l ~ ~  and Rhodes v. 
the Court approved a number of lower federal 
court opinions that granted relief from "deplorable" conditions 
in some of the country's oldest and worst prisons and jails.138 
Several of these lower court orders had implemented the right 
to safety.139 
Some states base the institutionalization on the parens patriae theory. Parens 
patriae refers to the inherent power of a state to "provid[e] care to its citizens who are 
unable . . . to care for themselves." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979). See, 
e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487,496 (D. Minn. 1974), aff 'd in part and vacated 
and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (The court cited approvingly the 
language of the doctrine, but did not explicitly mention parens patriae). For a history 
of the parens patriae theory, see Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 
27 Emory L.J. 195 (1978); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile 
Court, 23 S.C.L. Rev. 205 (1971). The Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limits 
on the doctrine by holding that when the state exercises this power it must take steps 
to ensure that the exercise of the state's power bears some relationship to its purpose. 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 
1977), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other 
grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980). 
The Supreme Court has denied relief in two individual damage claims involving 
the right to safety in prisons and jails. See infra note 153. 
441 U.S. 520 (1978). 
13' 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 n.11, 346-47, 352 n.17. 
The Rhodes majority cited with approval the following lower court decisions 
that had granted relief which included implementation of the right to safety in prison: 
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); 
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff 'd as modified, 559 
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per 
curiam). 
In Bell, the majority, without specification, approved of lower court decisions which 
"have condemned . . . sordid aspects of our prison systems." 441 U.S. at 562. See also 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 
(1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
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In 1982 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right 
to safety in the context of institutionalized mentally retarded 
persons. Youngberg v. Romeo140 was a damage action brought 
on behalf of a thirty-three-year-old retarded man with the mental 
capacity of an eighteen-month-old child. Romeo, confined in- 
voluntarily to the Pennhurst State Hospital, was "injured on 
numerous occasions, both by his own violence and by the re- 
actions of other [inmates] to him."141 Romeo's mother brought 
suit on his behalf against Pennhurst's director and two super- 
visors, alleging at least sixty-three incidents of violence against 
him. In an amended complaint, Romeo sought compensation for 
the failure to be protected and provided "treatment or programs 
for his mental retardat i~n." '~~ 
Following a jury verdict for the defendants, Romeo ap- 
pealed to the Third Circuit, complaining that the trial court's 
charge defined his rights as stemming only from the eighth 
amendment. The trial court, drawing on the Supreme Court's 
eighth amendment cases, had charged that liability would not 
attach for Romeo's injuries unless the defendants had been 
"deliberately indifferent" to his needs.143 The Third Circuit re- 
versed, holding that Romeo's right to safety was found in the 
fourteenth amendment, not the eighth, and that only "substantial 
necessity" could justify abridging it. The court also held that 
the right was broad enough to encompass Romeo's claim for 
treatment. 
Although the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the 
decision by the Third Circuit, the majority nevertheless held 
that the right to safety for the institutionalized was an "unques- 
tioned duty" of the state and was one of the "essentials of care 
that the state must provide."145 Justice Powell observed: 
"[Wlhen a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on 
the state . . . [there is] a duty to provide certain services."146 
The majority included the right to safety within the "historic 
I4O 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
l4' Id. at 310. 
1421d. at311. ' 
Id. at 312 n.11 (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155, 160, 169 (3d Cir. 
1980)). 
144 644 F.2d 147, 156, 160, 164. 
457 U.S. at 324. 
Id. at 317. 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 224 1988 
19881 Constitutional Protection of Foster Children 225 
liberty interests" essential to ensure a person's bodily integrity 
from unnecessary invasion by the state, thus qualifying the right 
to safety for substantive protection under the due process 
~1ause . I~~  The right survives involuntary commitment, and since 
the mentally retarded, unlike convicts, have not been guilty of 
any wrongdoing, the Court intimated that their rights may be 
even greater than those of prisoners.148 
While the Court had little difficulty identifying the right to 
safety as a substantive due process entitlement of the involun- 
tarily confined, it struggled to articulate a clear standard for 
determining when the right had been violated. The Court re- 
jected the "deliberate indifference" standard used in prison 
right-to-safety cases and by the district court in Yo~ngberg.'~~ 
On the other hand, the Court rejected the Third Circuit's "sub- 
stantial necessity" test as well.Is0 It is not entirely clear what 
test the Court adopted in its place. Justice Powell stated that 
courts should balance "the liberty [interest] of the individual" 
in safety against "the demands of an organized society."lS1 Re- 
strictions on liberty that are "reasonably related to legitimate 
government objectives" are not unconstitutional even if they 
result in a "lack of absolute safety."152 Just what "relevant state 
interests" Justice Powell had in mind for this balance are not 
readily apparent from his opinion.153 Despite the uncertainty 
Id. at 315-16. 
la Id. at 321-22. 
149 457 U.S. at 321-22. 
Id. at 322. 
Id. at 310. 
Id. at 319-20. 
IS3 The Court postulated that the denial of training might violate Romeo's right to 
safety if training were necessary to relieve his aggressive behaviors. The standard the 
Court used to make the determination of the amount of training required is whatever 
"an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety." Id. at 
324. The Court thus attached a "presumption of correctness" to the judgment of the 
"qualified" persons in charge of Romeo's care. 
It is by no means clear how such a standard applies in a typical class action right- 
to-safety case that arises from a lack of proper supervision, staff, or training, or from 
the failure to classify individuals by dangerousness or to erect more structures for safe 
confinement. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. These conditions occur 
because of a lack of funds to operate an adequate facility and a generalized lack of 
concern for the welfare of the inmates. Since such conditions normally are not the 
product of distinct professional judgments concerning the treatment to be given a specific 
individual, it is not easy to determine from the Court's opinion the standard a court 
should apply in a typical right-to-safety case. 
In two recent decisions, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Davidson v. 
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), the Court held that negligent failure to protect an inmate 
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about the appropriate standard, the Court's opinion leaves little 
doubt that a constitutional right to safety is included in the 
notion of substantive due process, which is applicable not only 
to prisoners but also to retarded persons who depend upon the 
state for the necessities of life, and who are, supposedly, con- 
fined for their own welfare. Is there any inherent reason for this 
right to be limited to those dependent on the state by reason of 
their institutionalization? The next subsection briefly explores 
that question. 
5. The Development of the Right to Safety Beyond 
Institutional Walls 
Inspired perhaps by Youngberg, the lower federal courts 
have recently expanded the boundaries of the right to safety 
beyond institutional walls. In Jensen v. Conrad,lS4 for example, 
the Fourth Circuit, in dicta, noted that the state owes a consti- 
tutional duty to protect a child who had been reported to state 
child protection workers as abused. There arose a duty to take 
steps to prevent further harm from occurring, the court held, 
from the moment the state became aware of the child's plight.'55 
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized this right to 
safety.Is6 That court had held that the Constitution protects 
persons who, while not in state custody, are nevertheless placed 
by the state in a position of danger and then left defenseless. 
When the state, by its actions, throws a person in such a "snake- 
pit," the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process is 
triggered.157 White v. R o c h f ~ r d ~ ~ ~  is a classic example of this 
idea. On a cold day the Chicago police stopped a car driven by 
a man transporting his two young nephews and cousin. The 
uncle was arrested and taken by police escort to the station for 
processing, but the car and the children were left on the shoulder 
from harm while incarcerated does not violate the due process clause. Curiously, neither 
the Daniels nor Davidson majority cited or addressed Youngberg. 
1% 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984). cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). 
, , 
lss 747 F.2d at 194. 
Is6 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 
381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
IJ7 Bo~vers. 686 F.2d at 618. 
158 592 ~ . 2 d  381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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of a busy eight-lane expressway despite the uncle's pleas. After 
exposure to the cold, the children decided to flee. Luckily, they 
escaped with their lives. The two older children were trauma- 
tized, but not physically injured. The five-year-old, an asth- 
matic, was hospitalized for one week following the incident. 
The children sued, seeking damages for their emotional and 
physical injuries. The Seventh Circuit held that these facts, if 
true, violated the right to safety even though the children were 
not in state custody: "[Leaving] heipless minor children subject 
to inclement weather and great physical damage without appar- 
ent justification . . . [is] a patently clear intrusion upon personal 
integrity.'7159 From the opinions it is not unreasonable to expect 
that the Supreme Court would recognize some constitutional 
right to safety for those not in state custody, but the question 
is not free from doubt and it is by no means clear what the 
parameters of that right would be.160 
B. The Lack of Development of the Right to Safety in the 
Foster Care Field 
Although the right to safety is well-established for other 
persons in state custody such as prisoners, mentally ill and 
retarded persons, foster children have not yet received much 
benefit from the right. G.L. v.  Z ~ m w a l t ' ~ ~  is the only case in 
which final relief was provided to a class of foster children 
predicated on a constitutional right-to-safety theory,162 and that 
case has limited precedential value because it was a consent 
159 Id. at 384. 
Several recent Circuit Court decisions further complicate this question. Compare 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(reckless failure by welfare authorities to protect a child from a parent's physical abuse 
did not violate the Constitution) and Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (no liability imposed on state for murder committed by inmate furloughed 
from the House of Corrections who independently conceived of and executed the 
murder) and Bradberry v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1986) (swimmer 
suffered no constitutional deprivation due to insufficient numbers of lifeguards or in- 
adequately trained lifeguards) with Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986) ("When a municipality puts an individual 
in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect that individual, it 
cannot be heard to say that its role was merely a passive one."). 
564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 
la See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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decree issued prior to trial.163 There is only one case in which 
damages were awarded to a foster child based on the right to 
safety.164 In addition, there are no reported decisions granting 
final injunctive relief to protect foster children from abuse and 
neglect in foster home placements. The limited case law suggests 
a judicial reluctance to accept the notion that foster children 
should be beneficiaries of this right. 
Taylor v. LedbetteF5 illustrates this trend. On behalf of a 
two-year-old girl, plaintiff sued the Gwinnett County, Georgia 
Department of Family and Children's Services for severe inju- 
ries that occurred while the child was in foster care. Plaintiff 
alleged that the child had been beaten by her foster mother and 
then given an overdose of unnecessary medication which caused 
her to become permanently comatose. The suit claimed that 
defendants had violated the child's constitutional right to safety 
by failing to investigate adequately the foster home before plac- 
ing the child, by failing to supervise the foster home, and by 
failing to provide complete medical information to the child's 
physicians. 
The original panel in Taylor affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. The court characterized plaintiff's ar- 
guments as "reflect[ingJ a misunderstanding of the role of federal 
Although the injuries to the child were obviously 
"serious," the court expressed its belief that "[flederal courts 
should exercise great caution in becoming involved in the de- 
cisions of state and local officials charged with the custody and 
welfare of chi1dren."l6* Thus, the court articulated what 
163 Generally, a consent judgment is binding only on the parties to the action. Green 
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 3d 124,345 N.E.2d 807 (1976). The 
Supreme Court, therefore, recently indicated that the provisions of a decree, even in a 
civil rights case, need not be fashioned strictly in accordance with governing law. Local 
93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,3077 (1986). 
See also Comment, Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City 
of Cleveland: A Consent Decree Is Not an Adjudicated Order for Purposes of Title VZI, 
20 Akron L. Rev. 547 (1987). 
la See supra note 1 1 and infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text. 
165 791 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd on rehearing, 818 F.2d 791 
(1 lth Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
166 791 F.2d at 882. 
Id. at 883, 
1" Id. at 884. The opinion made no mention of Youngberg. Indeed, it referred to 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 228 1988 
19881 Constitutional Protection of Foster Children 229 
amounted to another federal abstention doctrine. Although the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reversed the panel 
decision and held that the complaint should not have been dis- 
missed, it left for further proceedings whether or not the child's 
claim "constitutes a liberty interest protected by the due process 
clause."169 
Only in the Second Circuit has the right to safety been 
squarely recognized and enforced in the foster care context. In 
Brooks v. Richardson, the first reported case to discuss this 
issue, a district judge in the Southern District of New York 
refused to dismiss the pro se complaint of a mother who main- 
tained that her child had been abused and neglected for over 
five years while in foster care.170 The claim survived a motion 
to dismiss because "[a] child who is in the custody of the state 
and placed in foster care has a constitutional right to at least 
humane custodial care."171 The court noted that the purpose of 
foster care is to protect the child from harm in his permanent 
the "deliberate indifference" standard which the Supreme Court in Youngberg specifi- 
cally rejected as insufficient for persons not convicted of crime. 457 U.S. at 312 n.11. 
In Atchley v. County of DuPage, 638 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. IU. 1986), and Gibson v. 
Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1986), two other 
right-to-safety claims were rejected. In Atchley, the claim was rejected because the 
defendant was responsible for committing the child to foster care but did not have 
responsibility to supervise the foster home in which the injury occurred. 638 F. Supp. 
at 1240. In Gibson, the court assumed, without deciding, that a foster child has a 
constitutionally protected right to be free from harm. 799 F.2d at 589. However, the 
court found no denial of the right since the defendant's act of removing the child from 
the home of the foster parents, without their consent, appeared reasonable. 
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). In addition to 
the en banc opinion in Taylor, two recently decided cases granting preliminary relief to 
foster children indicate that the pendulum may now be swinging in the direction of 
recognition of the constitutional rights of children in foster care to safety. In Doe v. 
New York City Dep't of Social Services, 86 Civ. 4011 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1987) 
(granting motion for preliminary injunction), the court determined that the failure to 
obtain foster home placements immediately for children taken into state custody and 
the housing of these children overnight in social services offices violated plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights. Slip op. at 101. In L.J. v. Massinga, No. JH-84-4409 @. Md. July 
27, 1987) (granting motion for preliminary injunction), the court held that the plaintiffs, 
children in the Baltimore foster care system, were likely to prevail on their claims that 
they had a right to safety under Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act and the 
fourteenth amendment. Slip op. at 27-30. Pending final determination, the court awarded 
relief requiring the defendants to monitor foster homes, to provide appropriate medical 
care to foster children, to refer complaints of mistreatment for investigation, and to 
submit a plan to the court for the review of the continued licensing of any foster home 
in which a child had been maltreated. Id. at 53-54. 
Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
Id. at 795. 
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home. Given this purpose, the court stressed that it would be 
"ludicrous if the state, through its agents, could perpetrate the 
same that the placement in foster care was designed to 
prevent. 
It was not until the Second Circuit's decisions in Doe v. 
New York City Department of Social Services173 however, that 
a court actually awarded damages in a disputed case involving 
the right to safety. A foster child who had been beaten and 
sexually abused by her foster father sued, claiming that her 
plight had been or should have been known to the foster care 
agency responsible for her care.174 In Doe I, the circuit court 
reversed a jury verdict for the defendants on the grounds that 
the district court had incorrectly instructed the jury on the 
plaintiff's constitutional rights.175 In Doe 11,176 the court again 
reversed the trial court, this time for improperly setting aside a 
$225,000 jury verdict.177 Although it found for plaintiff, the Doe 
court did not identify the source of the constitutional right it 
invoked and it did not discuss the rationale for finding that the 
right applied in a foster care setting in either of its two opinions. 
The Court of Appeals referred to attributes of foster care that 
it intimated might render the application of right-to-protection 
concepts developed in the prison field unduly burdensomqto 
foster care administrators. The court distinguished foster care 
from other institutions on several grounds. 
First, other institutions have "closer and firmer lines of 
authority running from superiors [to] subordinates . . . than 
172 Id, at 796. 
173 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cerf.  denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (Doe I )  and 709 
F.2d 782, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983) (Doe TI) .  
17' For a graphic description of the facts, see Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social 
Services, 649 E2d 134, 137-40 (2d Cir, 1981), cerf. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). 
I75 The Doe I court held that the lower court "erroneously conveyed the impression 
that deliberate indifference and negligence were mutually exclusive[,]" id. at 143, when 
in reality, repeated acts of negligence could be perceived as "evidence of indifference." 
Id, at 142. The Second Circuit also attached great significance to the defendants' failure 
to comply with their statutory duty to report allegations of abuse for investigation. This 
failure, the court held, could constitute deliberate indifference to plaintiff's welfare. Id. 
176 709 E2d 782, cerf.  denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983). 
177 On remand, the jury found for plaintiff, but the same district judge set aside the 
verdict leading to the second appeal. Again, the Court of Appeals reversed, this time 
holding that there was sufficient evidence "of deliberate indifference respecting one 
very significant aspect of her welfare, the protection from abuse" to sustain the verdict. 
Id. at 790-92. 
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[those that] exist in the foster care context, particularly in re- 
spect of [sic] the relationship between agency personnel and the 
foster parent."17s In addition, the court asserted that information 
is not as easily gained about the treatment of foster care children 
as it can be in other settings since there are only "occasional 
visits" to foster homes by agency social ~ 0 r k e r s . l ~ ~  Finally, the 
court attached significance to the relationship between foster 
parents and foster care agencies which the court felt was less 
"unequivocally hierarchical than is the case with prison guards 
and a warden."lsO 
Despite these supposed differences, the Doe I court applied 
the deliberate indifference standard adopted by the Supreme 
Court for eighth amendment prison claims. The court apparently 
did not feel the need to articulate a standard that would accord 
foster children greater protection than prisoners. Indeed, the 
weight of the court's logic cuts in the opposite direction. 
A curious kind of constitutional vacuum, therefore, seems 
to exist with respect to foster children. Aside from a single and 
largely unexplained damage award, and a solitary consent de- 
cree, foster children remain the sole identifiable group held in 
the grip of the state still not accorded the benefits of the fun- 
damental constitutional protection of safety.lsl Several factors 
may account for this strange state of affairs. 
First, as even the Doe court suggested, foster care is seen 
as a particularly benevolent service run by the state with the 
best of intentions.lS2 Prisons, jails, mental institutions, and 
homes for the retarded have long been regarded as dumping 
grounds for persons who are despised by society.lS3 It is rela- 
tively easy for the judicial mind, once freed from the shackles 
of the hands-off doctrine, to imagine abuses taking place in these 
Doe I, 649 E2d at 142. 
Id. 
Id. 
See supra notes 119, 121-24, 164 and accompanying text. 
Is2 The Doe court observed that where the child is placed in a foster home, there 
is a tendency "to respect the foster family's autonomy and integrity [and to] . . . 
minimize intrusiveness, given its goals of approximating a normal family environment 
for foster children." 649 F.2d at 142. 
lg3 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (quoting W. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional 
Models 3 (1975)) aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd 
on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980). 
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dark places; the same is not true for foster care. When children 
are taken from their parents out of an expressed concern for 
their welfare, and, following removal, are placed in a seemingly 
normal home for care by civilians who have volunteered for the 
job, one is not automatically concerned. The supervision of the 
placement is done not by wardens or jailers, but by social work- 
ers, the very epitome of a helping profession.lS4 It is hard to 
grasp the idea that here, too, abuses can occur, and that when 
they do they are largely unchecked by the state. 
Second, flowing from the idea that only good intentions are 
at work in the foster care field, is the corollary notion that 
decisions with regard to foster care require a type of decision- 
making skill which is not appropriately the subject of judicial 
review. After all, the job of a foster care agency involves nothing 
less than child rearing, a discipline whose coinplexity has gen- 
erated scores of theories and occupied the attention of numerous 
scholars. It may have been this thought that motivated the 
Supreme Court in a case involving the due process rights of a 
foster child and a foster parent to remain together, to declare 
that foster care administration involves "issues of unusual del- 
icacy . . . where professional judgments regarding desirable pro- 
cedures are constantly and rapidly changing."lS5 
Even in Doe, these factors surfaced and influenced the 
court's decision. The court stated that given the goal of estab- 
lishing a normal home for the child the court should "minimize 
intrusiveness" into the foster family.lg6 The Ninth Circuit exer- 
cised a similar caution when it proclaimed a "need for flexibility 
[in foster care] in order to accomplish what is best for [the] 
Third, in addition to the courts' reluctance to entertain right 
to safety cases, litigators do not seem to press claims to safety 
in foster care with the same vigor that they exert in the prison 
lu See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,322-23 (1971). H. Ginott, Between Parent 
and Child 215-16 (1965). 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 
816, 855 (1977). There is a parallel between this reasoning and underlying concepts of 
judicial and prosecutorial immunity, such as that expressed by the Court in Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
la Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 142. 
Gibson, 799 E2d at 589. 
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and mental health fields. Their hesitancy may be accounted for 
by the fact that there are fewer public interest lawyers working 
in the foster care field than in the other fields where this issue 
has been litigated,lss and the few that are in the field have 
primarily chosen to concentrate on other pressing issues which 
foster care administration raises, including questions of perma- 
nency planning and preventive services, often to the exclusion 
of right-to-safety concerns. Success in a right-to-safety case will 
not provide a permanent home for the children, only a safer 
placement while they remain in temporary care.lS9 Thus, both 
the dearth of lawyers pursuing the issue and the reluctance of 
the courts to entertain the claims have combined to create a 
barrier between foster children and the constitutional promise 
of safe custodial conditions. It is now necessary to consider 
whether any principled reasons exist that might render the right 
to safety inapplicable to foster children. 
111. The Search for a Principled Basis for Withholding the 
Right to Safety 
There are three possible explanations for denying a consti- 
tutional right to safety to foster children while providing it to 
other groups or persons cared for by the state. First, children 
in foster family care are not institutionalized. Second, foster 
children come into state care voluntarily. Finally, foster children 
may be subject to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ingraham v. 
Wright,lgo which held that school children do not have an eighth 
amendment right to be protected from physical harm by their 
custodians. This section analyzes whether any of these proposed 
differences between foster children and other groups provide a 
In 1980, there were approximately 700 public interest lawyers working in 117 
public interest law centers. Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8, at 45. Less than 
seven percent of these lawyers concern themselves with children's issues, a number 
smaller than a "medium-sized law firm in Denver, Colorado." Id. at 49. 
lS9 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text, and infra notes 200-201 and 
accompanying text. Public interest lawyers in other fields are not always put to such a 
hard choice. If public interest lawyers in the prisoners' rights field, for example, were 
forced to choose between litigation that would lead to the release of some of their 
clients because of invalid convictions or litigation to improve the living conditions of 
all of their clients while they are in prison, there might never have been the extensive 
case law on prison reform. 
I9O 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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principled basis for a determination that foster children are not 
eligible for the constitutional protection of the right to safety, 
and demonstrates that they do not. 
A. Custody Without Institutionalization 
Children in foster family care do not reside in large com- 
munal custodial settings like prisons or mental  institution^.^^^ 
Moreover, because of their age, children in foster care would 
be under the control of an adult whether or not they were placed 
in foster care. In this sense, children in foster care differ from 
institutionalized adults who, but for their confinement, would 
be free to do what they wished and live where they pleased. 
These factors were important to the Supreme Court in Leh- 
man v. Lycoming County Children's Services,192 which held that 
a foster child was not in "custody" for purposes of the habeas 
corpus jurisdiction of the federal court. The case arose when a 
mother brought suit, on behalf of her three sons, to challenge 
the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute under which the 
state obtained custody of her children and terminated her pa- 
rental rights.193 Without reaching the merits, the Court held that 
habeas corpus did not lie because the children "are not prisoners 
. . . [who] suffer any restrictions imposed by a state criminal 
justice system."194 Justice Powell for the majority stated that 
foster children: 
191 See slrpra note 6 and accompanying text. 
192458 U.S. 502 (1981). 
19J Ms. Lehman placed her three sons in the custody of the Lycoming County 
Children's Services Agency, which placed them in foster homes. She visited her sons 
monthly, but did not request their return for three years, at which time the Lycoming 
County Children's Services Agency initiated parental termination proceedings. The 
district court terminated her parental rights based on Ms. Lehman's "limited social and 
intellectual development" and her "five-year separation from the children." Id. at 504. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Id. at 505. 
Ms. Lehman sought review in the United States Supreme Court by a writ of 
certiorari rather than by appeal. Review was denied. Lehman v. Lycoming County 
Children's Services, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). She then sought a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $1 2241, 2254 in the United States District Court of the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, requesting a declaration of invalidity of the Pennsylvania 
statute under which her parental rights were terminated, a declaration that she was the 
children's legal parent, and an order releasing the children into her custody. Id. at 505- 
06. The district court dismissed the petition, without a hearing, on jurisdictional grounds. 
This dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit, sitting en banc. Id. at 506. 
Id. at 510. 
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are in the "custody" of their foster parents in essen- 
tially the same way, and to the same extent, other 
children are in the custody of their natural or adoptive 
parents. Their situation in this respect differs little from 
the situation of other children in the public generally; 
they suffer no unusual restraints not imposed on other 
children. 1g5 
In Child v. Beame,lg6 the district court made a similar observa- 
tion in the course of dismissing a foster child's claim to a con- 
stitutional right to adoption. The court stated that: 
the attempt to equate the child plaintiff's status while 
in the foster care of the state with those who are taken 
into custody under a civil commitment because of men- 
tal illness, physical retardation, incorrigibility or simi- 
lar causes is somewhat farfetched. The civilly commit- 
ted have been deprived of their liberty by the state 
while the state's action in taking the child plaintiffs into 
foster care, whether with an institution or foster parent, 
is not a deprivation of liberty. The state has merely 
provided a home in substitution for the one the parents 
failed to provide.lg7 
These cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that 
foster children are insufficiently deprived of liberty to invoke 
judicial review of the conditions of their care. First of all, neither 
Lehman nor Child were challenges to the living conditions of 
foster care. Instead, both courts were confronted with claims 
that questioned the very presence of the children in foster 
care.lg8 In Child, the court made this distinction clear when it 
noted that "plaintiffs do not question the living conditions in 
195 Id. at 510. 
412 F. Supp 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
197 Id. at 608. 
lg8 In both Lehman and Child, the complaints were not related to the conditions of 
the foster care placement, but to the fact or duration of placement, respectively. In 
Lehman, the fact of placement in foster care was at issue since plaintiff's parental rights 
were terminated upon her request to have her children released to her from foster care. 
In Child, plaintiff children alleged a deliberate policy of keeping children in foster care 
settings without seeking adoptive homes. 412 F. Supp. at 596. 
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their foster homes."lg9 But in a right-to-safety case, the plaintiff 
does not rely upon a liberty claim of restricted movement, as 
was the case in both Lehman and Child. Rather, the claim 
concerns the substantive due process liberty interest in being 
held safely.200 The key to the existence of a right to safety lies 
in the recipient's dependence upon the state for the maintenance 
of a safe living environment,201 not in the recipient's assertion 
that the state cannot restrict his liberty at all. 
For example, prisoners cannot choose who they want to 
provide needed medical care, what they will eat, or with whom 
they will share their living quarters. These decisions, made by 
their keepers, will, in large measure, determine the quality of 
their lives. It is this dependence on the state for the very essen- 
tials of life, not the fact of institutionalization, that has prompted 
the courts to recognize the entitlement to safety in the institu- 
tional context.202 
Foster children, like prisoners, rely on the state for shelter, 
clothing, food, and freedom from physical abuse or neglect. 
Although they may not be held in large institutional settings, 
they are just as dependent on the state for their needs as are 
prisoners. This similarity is not diminished because the state 
chooses to act through private agents in the foster care context. 
Surely, if the state maintained a group home for children on 
state property, providing two adults per child, it would be most 
difficult to distinguish the children's situation from that of pris- 
oners. In that circumstance, the state, having institutionalized 
the children, would presumably be compelled to comply with 
the constitutional requirements, including the right to safety, 
applicable to institutionalized persons generally.203 Regardless 
of the locus of confinement, the sole purpose for the state's 
intervention into the children's lives is protection.204 Both the 
199 Id. at 608. 
See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text. 
m l  Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("An inmate must rely on prison 
officials to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not 
be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical. . . torture. . . . 
In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering.") 
lo2 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Halderman v. Pennhurst 
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973, aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980). 
m3 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1 17-38a (West 1987) ("The public policy of 
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rationale for foster care placement and the dependence on the 
state emphasize the absurdity in excluding foster children from 
the constitutional protection from harm merely because they are 
not institutionalized in the traditional way. 
Lehman's discussion of the liberty implications of foster 
family placement is inapposite to a right-to-safety analysis for 
another reason: Lehman dealt solely with a question of statu- 
tory, not constitutional, construction. There the issue for deci- 
sion was whether a foster child's movement was sufficiently 
restricted such that a federal habeas corpus petition would lie. 
The Court held that, for purposes of habeas corpus, the children 
were not in " c ~ s t o d y , " ~ ~ ~  and that the mother, therefore, could 
not seek a federal court order to obtain their release from care. 
A right-to-safety case involves a different issue. In contrast to 
a habeas corpus petition, which is calculated to review the 
legality of custody, a right-to-safety case questions not the fact 
of confinement, but the conditions of confinement.206 Thus, Leh- 
man is not authority for the proposition that foster children lack 
a constitutional right to be protected, but only that the federal 
habeas corpus statute is not the way to assert such a right. 
B. Voluntary Placement and the Right to Safety 
The overwhelming majority of foster care placements are 
voluntary, meaning that the child's parents have consented to a 
[the] state is: To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected 
through injury and neglect; to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for 
children by enhancing parental capacity for good child care; to provide a temporary or 
permanent nurturing and safe environment for children when necessary. . . ."); Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 § 1 (West 1987); N.Y. Soc. Sew. Law § 395 (McKinney 1983) 
(a public welfare district shall be responsible for the welfare of children residing or 
found in its territory who are in need of public assistance, support and protection); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. 8 409.145 (West 1986). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text. Courts 
have expressed this purpose as well. See, e-g., Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 
793,795-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
205 Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511. 
206 In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court confirmed that the Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, can be used to challenge the conditions of confinement. 
Habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1966) is the appropriate device with which to challenge 
the propriety of confinement. 
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placement.207 Consent to foster care occurs when physical or 
mental illness, economic problems or other family crises make 
it impossible for parents-particularly single mothers-to pro- 
vide a stable home life for their children.208 Often the consensual 
placement follows a state-sponsored investigation into condi- 
tions of a deteriorating home caused by these pressures. Other 
times, a parent may seek government help.209 In either event, 
the normal concomitant of foster care for most children is the 
consent of their parents. In this sense, children enter foster care 
in a manner that is quite different from the means by which 
other groups normally enter state control. Prisoners, to take the 
most obvious example, do not as a routine matter ask to be 
imprisoned.210 
The decision by the Supreme Court in Youngberg can be 
understood as supporting the notion that the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary institutionalization is significant. In 
no fewer than eleven places in the majority opinion, Justice 
Powell stated that the due process right to safety which the 
Court was recognizing for the first time applied to the involun- 
tarily committed.211 Given the emphasis by the Court on the 
involuntary nature of the confinement, one must ask whether 
the entitlement to safety in foster care should depend on, or be 
207 See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's 
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887, 921-22 (1975) (as many as 
50% voluntary placements); A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 138 (Studies from New York 
and elsewhere estimate the percentage of voluntary placements between 50 and 90%. 
In Massachusetts, 58.8% of the placements are voluntary); Mnookin, In Whose Best 
Interest?, supra note 6, at 601; Musewicz, supra note 10, at 639; Information Services, 
Characteristics of Children in Foster Care, New York City Reports, table 11 (1976). 
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 824 (1977). 
209 A. Kadushin, supra note 6, at 316. Voluntary placement in foster care is usually 
a two-part process. Initially parents and a local social service official enter a voluntary 
placement agreement (VPA), which sets forth the terms and conditions of a child's care 
and transfers the custody of the child from the parent to the authorized agency. 
If a child will be in custody for more than 30 days, the social services official must 
obtain judicial approval of the VPA. The judge must be shown that the parents volun- 
tarily and knowingly entered the VPA, that they were unable to provide adequate care 
at home, and that the child's best interests would be promoted by placement in foster 
care. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770,773 (2d Cir. 1983); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 
816, 824 n.9 (1977). 
21° Even prisoners who voluntarily enter guilty pleas are not choosing to come 
under state control. A guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently given is a defendant's 
choice among several limited alternatives; it is a bargain with the prosecutor for what 
is seen as the "least bad" option. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-39 (1970). 
2'1 457 U.S. at 310,312,313,314,315,316,318,321,322. 
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influenced by, the voluntary nature of most foster care place- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ' ~  For three reasons, it should not. 
First, characterizing foster care placements as voluntary is 
highly questionable; certainly they are not voluntary for the 
person under care. The children themselves have no more 
choice about placement than an involuntarily committed pris- 
oner or mental patient. They are rarely asked whether they 
desire to be in foster and it is not clear that they should 
be asked. It is impossible to believe that all but a small per- 
centage of children would have the maturity and ability to make 
an informed judgment.214 No rational system would seek the 
consent of a three-year-old, for example, as a condition of un- 
dertaking his care. As then-Chief Justice Burger put it: "[Mlost 
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make 
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their 
need for medical care or treatment."215 
Yet even the choice for the foster child's parent is largely 
illusory as well. Many parents reluctantly agree to relinquish 
custody temporarily in the face of a clear inability to care for 
their child by themselves.216 This is particularly true of impe- 
cunious parents, since, unlike the middle class who can arrange 
for alternatives when family problems occur, "the poor have 
212 Consent can sometimes make a difference. In Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 
(2d Cir. 1983), for example, the Second Circuit rejected a facial challenge to the loss of 
parental control entailed in the New York State scheme for voluntary foster care 
placement. The court relied in part upon the absence of evidence that consent was 
coerced and in part on the idea that the state could constitutionally condition consent 
to foster care on the diminution of parental rights. Id. at 777-82. But the court's ruling 
was limited. It made plain that if, on remand, plaintiffs' allegations of a "Dickensian 
portrait of the New York foster care system" were true, and if it was a system that 
"greedily grasps control over every child placed within its domain," the result might be 
diierent despite the presence of consent. Id. at 783. Joyner, therefore, does not support 
the argument that consent to placement, in and of itself, eliminates the obligation of the 
state to comply with the Constitution. 
213 In his study, Gruber found that twenty-seven percent of the children voluntarily 
placed in foster care were opposed to the decision. A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 141. 
The lack of weight of the child's preference is reflected in most state statutes dealing 
with foster care, where either the child's consent is not sought or is sought for limited 
purposes only after he reaches a certain age (commonly 14). See, e.g., Minn. Stat. 
§ 260.245; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5 2151.353 (Baldwin 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. 1 30:4c-11 
(West 1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 23 (West 1958). 
214 One study found that almost half of all foster children were too young to under- 
stand the reasons that they were placed in foster care. A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 141. 
215 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
2'6 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. 
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little choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when 
family crises strike."217 Voluntariness of placement is illusory 
for another reason: the state social worker who investigated the 
home may have threatened the parent with the permanent loss 
of the child unless there was "consent" to temporary place- 
ment.218 Whereas punitive and coercive techniques are usually 
expressly prohibited, pressure is often seen by the caseworker 
as legitimate. Thus the area between free choice and unaccept- 
able coercion often is unclear.219 
It is a small wonder that most parents in this predicament 
opt for voluntary placement. They must either consent to the 
placement, retaining some chance of having the child returned 
later, or refuse consent and face the prospect of defending a 
state-sponsored child protection proceeding in the local family 
court, which, if they lose, significantly diminishes the possibility 
of retaining parental rights.220 Even in those cases where the 
consent is genuine, it cannot reasonably be understood to be a 
voluntary decision to expose a child to unsafe conditions.221 
Indeed, such a decision would constitute child abuse as that 
term is defined in most state 
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 834. See also Association for Retarded Citizens 
v, Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). 
m8 Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 601. 
Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystifcation of the Child Protection System, 35 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1973). See also Musewicz, supra note 10, at 639 (such parents 
are "frequently uneducated and without legal advice except for that offered by the social 
worker encouraging the placement"). 
"O Mnookin, In Wltose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 601. See also Children's 
Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 18; Levine, supra note 219, at 23-24. 
"I The government may not condition the receipt of these, or any, benefits on the 
non-assertion of a constitutional right even if the benefits are considered a "mere 
privilege." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 510 (1978). But see Town of Newton 
v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987), where the Court held lawful a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of the right to file a civil rights complaint in exchange for dismissal of criminal 
charges. 
"2 Such treatment would, for example, constitute neglect under New Jersey law: 
"Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the following acts, by anyone having the 
custody or control of the child: . . . failure to do or permit to be done any act necessary 
for the child's physical or moral well-being." N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 9 6 1  (West 1976). See 
also, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 8 1 (West 1958); Corn. Gen. Stat. § 17-38a 
(West 1975). Federal standards also suggest that exposure to unsafe conditions consti- 
tutes abuse or neglect. Placing a child in such conditions, for example, falls within the. 
definition of child abuse and neglect given in the Chid Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act: "[Clhild abuse and neglect means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or 
exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen 
. . . by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances which 
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The second reason that the constitutional right to safety 
should not depend upon the voluntariness of the placement is 
that the right, as even the Youngberg Court appears to have 
recognized, is too basic to depend upon that factor alone. The 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Youngberg itself, notwithstanding 
its repeated use of the term "involuntarily committed," suggests 
that the right to safety encompasses the voluntarily as well as 
the involuntarily confined. Relying on precedent, the Court 
stated: "If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted 
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to 
confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be punished 
at all-in unsafe conditions."223 "An individual's liberty is no 
less worthy of protection merely because he has consented to 
be placed in a situation of confinement."224 If a person lost all 
claim to constitutional protection because he consented to con- 
finement, "the state arguably could chain confined residents to 
their beds and administer wanton physical beatings without vi- 
olating the constitution. This . . . represents a complete abdi- 
cation of the state's constitutional duty to respect the rights of 
all its citizens to fundamental liberty."225 
Third, the right to safety must apply to voluntary admis- 
sions because of the established constitutional principle that a 
state must administer constitutionally even those services which 
it only provides voluntarily.226 Similar treatment by the Supreme 
indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby. . . ." 42 
U.S.C. 8 5102 (1982). This act and other federal child protection acts are discussed in 
D. Besharov, The Abused and Neglected Child: Multi-Disciplinary Court Practice 11- 
33 (1978). 
457 U.S. at 315-16. Furthermore, "[among] the historic liberties so protected 
was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on 
personal security." Zngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673. See also Association for 
Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,485 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd 713 F.2d 1384 
(8th Cu. 1983). 
If Justice Powell really meant to limit the right to safety to the involuntarily 
confined, he picked a strange case in which to do it. Romeo was committed by court 
order on petition of his mother, his sole caretaker, who stated that she could no longer 
care for him. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, was not wrong when he said 
that "the state did not seek custody of respondent; the family understandably sought 
the state's aid to meet a serious need." 457 U.S. at 329. 
224 Association for Retarded Citizens, 561 E Supp. at 485. 
zz Id. See also Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 
1239, 1245 (2d Cir. 1984). 
226 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). This principle has been 
relied upon in several cases dealing with voluntary and involuntary confinement. See, 
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Court of the state provision of education illustrates this princi- 
ple. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no 
right to compel a state to establish a system of free education 
for its ~ i t izens .~~7 However, the Court has also held that once it 
elects to provide such a system, it must administer that system 
in conformity with constitutional commands.228 Similarly, al- 
though there is no recognized affirmative constitutional right to 
the provision of foster care,229 the state, having chosen to pro- 
vide the service, is obligated to administer it ~onstitutionally.~30 
In short, since most children cannot consent to foster care, 
since few parents truly consent to foster care, since none con- 
sent to unsafe care for their children, since safety is too impor- 
tant to be bartered or dependent on the voluntary nature of the 
service, and since the provision of a service by the state must 
be administered constitutionally, the constitutional right to 
safety must follow all children into care regardless of whether 
or not their placement is voluntary. 
C. Ingraham v. Wright and the Constitutional Right to Safety 
Zngraham v. Wright231 held that the eighth amendment does 
not protect school children from excessive corporal punish- 
ment.232 The Court also held that children may be physically 
punished by their teachers without a prior due process hear- 
ing.233 Taken together, these holdings might suggest that foster 
children also lack constitutional protection from physical abuse, 
e.g., Yo~rtigberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16; Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. 
Cuomo, 737 F.2d at 1245-46. 
"'Sari Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973), and 
cases cited therein. 
us Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
~9 See Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
See Society for Good Will to Retarded Citizens v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 
(2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, most state foster care laws do not even discuss distinctions 
between voluntary and involuntary placement when dealing with the level of care to 
which the foster child is entitled. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Sew. Law $5 358a, 372a, 372c 
(Consol. 1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. $ 257.071 (West 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 3107.02 
(Baldwin 1987): N.J. Stat. Ann. 130.4C (West 1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119. 
5 23 (West 1969). 
430 U.S. 651 (1977) (In as-4 decision, Justice White--joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Stevens-filed a sham dissent in which they decried the maiority opinion). 
- - -  
a' Id. at 662-71. 
Id. at 672-82. 
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but such a result is not compelled by either the reasoning or 
result of Ingraham. 
Ingraham does not foreclose right-to-safety cases for foster 
children because the rationale the Court used for holding that 
school children do not require constitutional protection from 
physical abuse does not apply to foster care. Ingraham placed 
great emphasis on the openness of the public schools and the 
watchfulness of school children's parents. Schools, the Court 
also pointed out, are not closed, twenty-four-hour-a-day insti- 
t u t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  These factors, which the court found make mistreat- 
ment of school children unlikely, were contrasted with the case 
of prisons, where the eighth amendment does apply. Judicial 
scrutiny of penal conditions engendered by eighth amendment 
commands is important precisely because prisons are institu- 
tions not usually open to public view, and because, as a group, 
prison inmates are powerless and friendless.235 
For purposes of constitutional protection and judicial inter- 
vention, foster children have more of the attributes of prisoners 
than of school children. Like prison, and unlike school, foster 
'care is a total institutional setting. No school bell rings for foster 
children each day releasing them from care. Foster children, 
unlike school children, cannot rely on the watchful eyes of their 
parents to protect them from abuse; they are in foster care 
precisely because their parents cannot care for them.236 
The Court in Ingraham also held that procedural due pro- 
cess protection is not required before corporal punishment may 
rw Id. at 670. In an interview with Bill Moyers broadcast the evening before his 
resignation from the Supreme Court, Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion, 
offered this additional insight into the Court's reasoning: 
I knew from my own experience in public education that the public schools 
are quite public in the sense that PTA's-Parent Teacher Associations-school 
board meetings are open to the public and parents come and testify before the 
school board. I've sat through some long evenings with parents complaining 
about this or that, that if there were any abuse of this provision of the Florida 
Statute (providing for corporal punishment) that pressure would immediately 
or promptly be brought on the particular school to correct it. And I just thought 
it was not a situation for the judicial system of our country to become involved 
in. 
The Search for the Constitution, Interview with Justice Lewis Powell (PBS broadcast, 
June 25, 1987) (transcribed by author). 
US Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669. 
See supra notes 6 ,8 ,  17,87 and accompanying text. 
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be inflicted because physical punishment of school children is 
generally "unremarkable in physical severity."237 Civil and crim- 
inal state remedies were more than adequate to control those 
few instances in which excessive punishment of school children 
did occur.238 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of foster 
care. The same factors that render foster care more akin to a 
prison or juvenile detention facility than a school also provide 
an environment in which serious abuse goes unchecked and 
may remain unknown to the outside world.u9 
The Ingraham Court limited itself to plaintiff's eighth 
amendment and procedural due process claims;240 it expressly 
stated that it had no occasion to decide whether "corporal pun- 
ishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent 
cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due 
Process Clause."241 Since the Ingraham record did not disclose 
widespread abuse, the issue was not before the Court. The 
problem of foster family abuse, however, does raise this unre- 
solved issue.242 
IV. The Search for a Remedy for Violence in Foster Care 
It is well-established that for every right there should be a 
corresponding remedy.243 It is particularly important to find an 
U71trgralram, 430 U.S. at 677. 
Id. at 672-82. 
U9 As suggested infra, state tort remedies in this field are not adequate. See infra 
notes 245-73 and accompanying text. 
a0 For a comparison of procedural due process and substantive due process, see 
getrerally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 324-25, 416-24 (2d 
ed. 1983). 
430 U.S. at 679 11.47. This distinction explains how the Court in Youngberg 
could hold that the right to safety for the mentally retarded flows from the substantive 
provision of the fourteenth, and not from the eighth, amendment. 457 U.S. at 314-15 
& 11.16. The Court has similarly held that rights of pretrial detainees derive from the 
due process clause, not the eighth, amendment. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 
U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
a* In a post-Itrgrakam decision, the Fourth Circuit held that school children have 
a substantive due process right to be protected from corporal punishment that amounts 
to "brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience." 
Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Doe "A" v. Special School 
Dist. of St. Louis County, 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Brooks v. School Bd. 
of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
243 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) flhe laws of the 
United States furnish remedies for the violation of vested legal rights.). 
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effective remedy for violence in foster care. .Without the basic 
right to safety, the dignity of the foster child and his ability to 
develop into a mature, functioning adult are diminished.244 This 
section canvasses the available remedies for foster care vio- 
lence, and demonstrates that the structural injunction, not the 
damage action, offers the only effective remedy for violence in 
foster care. 
A. The Unavailability of Damage Actions 
Abused foster children are increasingly turning to state 
damage actions for compensation for the injuries that they have 
suffered. Some of these suits, which have survived pretrial dis- 
reveal a formidable array of state tort law barriers to 
ultimate success. Foremost among these is the common law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In its purest form, the doctrine 
bars a suit against a state agency providing a governmental 
service.246 Suits are permitted in the doctrine's more modern 
version, but only if the plaintiff can show that the governmental 
activity sued upon is ministerial rather than di~cretionary.~~~ The 
theory of this distinction is that the state ought to be free to 
carry on its wide-ranging activities unimpeded by the risk of 
liability for decisions that involve its discretionary, policymak- 
ing functions .248 
In jurisdictions that recognize the modern sovereign im- 
munity doctrine, a key issue in a suit brought by an abused 
foster child is whether or not an agency's actions involved 
244 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
245 See, e.g., Maybeny v. Pryor, 134 Mich. App. 826,352 N.W.2d 322 (1984), rev'd, 
422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985) (summary judgment in favor of foster parents 
reversed); Zink v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 496 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 
App. 1986) (summary judgment in favor of the defendant reversed). 
246 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See generally 
W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 117, 5 131 at 1044. 
247 See, e-g., Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67,251 N.W.2d 866 (1977). Despite 
important variations, all states retain immunity from suits that result from discretionary 
governmental activities. The variations are as follows: a few states retain total immunity 
from suit; some still preclude suits by individuals in courts, but have created adminis- 
trative agencies that have the authority to decide claims against the state; others have 
consented judicially to suits in only a very limited class of cases. Most states, however, 
allow suits for non-discretionary activities that cause injury. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, 
supra note 117, 5 131, at 1044. 
248 Id. at 1039. 
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discretionary decisionmaking. If the court finds that they did, 
sovereign immunity bars the suit regardless of the agency's 
negligence. The courts that have examined the issue have split 
on whether the conditions of foster care placement involve this 
judicially protected discretion. Several jurisdictions have held 
that there is no sovereign immunity,249 because there is no dis- 
cretion involved in the foster care supervision process. Others, 
however, have applied sovereign immunity.250 These courts, 
pointing to the "delicate and complex judgments" required of 
foster care agencies,251 and alluding to foster care as an altruistic 
governmental entitled to a high degree of judicial de- 
ference, have shielded agencies from "hindsight scrutiny by the 
Even in jurisdictions that do not accord sovereign immunity 
to foster care agencies, however, recovery is difficult. The 
agency may escape liability by shifting its portion of the blame 
for the injury to the foster parents.254 Having done so, it is then 
able to avoid responsibility for the injury under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, on the ground that foster parents are not 
employees of the state.2s5 The policy reasons that one court 
assigned for this result are revealing. That court held that the 
legislature could not have intended that foster parents be re- 
garded as state employees because: "A legal theory conferring 
employee status on foster parents . . . would place an intolerable 
burden on the state and might well diminish the beneficial effect 
of the foster care program."256 
See, e.g., Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977); 
National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982). 
so Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Walker v. State, 
104 Misc. 2d 221, 428 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1980); Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 
1263,572 P.2d 1070 (1977); Jiminez v. County of Santa Cruz, 42 Cal. App. 3d 407, 116 
Cal. Rptr. 878 (1974). 
Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 1268, 572 P.2d 1070, 1074 
(1977). 
U2 Id. at 1268, 572 P.2d at 1074. 
s' Id. 
s4 See, e.g., Blanca v. Nassau County, 103 A.D.2d 524,480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1984), 
a / f d  sub nont. Blanca C. By Carmen M. v. Nassau County, 65 N.Y.2d 712,481 N.E.2d 
545, 492 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1985); Parker v. St. Christopher's Home, 77 A.D.2d 921 (1980). 
See, e.g., New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 184 N.J. 
Super. 348, 446 A.2d 189 (1982), rev'd, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 477 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 
99 N.J. 188,491 A.2d 691 (1984); Kern v. Steele County, 322 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1982). 
Us New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 16, 
477 A.2d 826, 833 (1984). 
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Even when sovereign immunity is not invoked, or blame is 
shifted to foster parent negligence, the courts have resisted 
finding negligent supervision by the agency. In Koepf v. County 
of Y ~ r k , ~ ~ ~  for example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed 
a directed verdict in favor of a foster care agency. In that case, 
a fourteen-month-old child had died from severe physical inju- 
ries inflicted by his foster parent. Four months prior to the 
child's death, the agency had been told that the foster mother 
was not emotionally stable and that she did not take good care 
of the Expert testimony also revealed that the foster 
mother was on medication for "physiological depression and 
mental confusion."259 Finally, there was testimony that three 
weeks before the child was killed, he appeared at a state court 
hearing with bruise marks on his body.260 Despite this substantial 
evidence of agency negligence, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
agreed that this was still not enough evidence to submit the case 
to a jury. 
Sovereign immunity, the unavailability of respondeat su- 
perior, and the courts' reluctance to find an agency negligent in 
its supervisory capacity make the opportunity for recovery 
against an agency slight. They do not preclude damage actions 
against the foster parents themselves, or the individual case- 
worker assigned to the case. The chance of recovery, however, 
is slim there as well. 
In several jurisdictions, foster parents are immune from suit 
for negligent supervision of their foster on the theory 
that foster parents stand in the place of permanent parents and 
therefore are entitled to the same family immunity.262 If this 
"loco par en ti^"^^^ doctrine of parental immunity is applied, no 
257 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977). 
258 Id. at 76, 251 N.W.2d at 872. 
259 Id. 
Id. 
Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Goller v. White, 20 
Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
262 In re Diane P., 120 N.H. 791, 424 A.2d 178 (1980); Rutkauski v. Wasko, 286 
A.D. 327,143 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955); Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639,259 N.W.2d 
170 (1977); Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980). 
263 "LOCO parentis" refers to a person "who intentionally accepts the rights and 
duties of natural parenthood with respect to a child not his own." In re Diane P., 120 
N.H. 791,424 A.2d 178 (1980) (citing Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 E2d 683,686 
(6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947)). See generally 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent 
and Child 1 77 (1987). 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 247 1988 
248 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 23 
judgment can be awarded for negligence against foster parents 
for their failure to maintain a safe home. Even if the parental 
immunity doctrine is not invoked, however, the chance of a 
recovery remains slight. Foster parents, normally drawn from 
the ranks of moderate-income families, are often judgment 
proof,264 and as they are not considered state employees, the 
states do not indemnify them for judgments entered against 
them.265 
Suits under state law against individual, state-employed 
caseworkers, while theoretically possible in states without sov- 
ereign immunity doctrines, also are not likely to succeed be- 
cause state-employed caseworkers are generally judgment- 
proof.266 Federal civil rights damage actions are unavailing as 
well, because the Supreme Court has approved several imposing 
eleventh qualified immunity,268 and Monell 
2M See Cathey v. Bernard, 467 So.2d 9, 10 (La. App. 1985). 
New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 184 N.J. Super. 348, 
446 A.2d 189, rev'd, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 477 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 99 N.J. 188, 491 
A.2d 691 (1984). 
266 Note, A Damages Remedy for Abuses by Child Protection Workers, 90 Yale 
L.J. 681, 695 (1981). 
267 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (state immunity); Pennhurst State 
School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (state immunity); Brandon v. Holt, 
469 U.S. 464 (1985) (official immunity). For the latest version of the enormous contro- 
versy over the scope of the eleventh amendment, compare the majority decision written 
by Justice Powell with Justice Brennan's dissent in Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 
107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987). For a sampling of the scholarly debate, see Shapiro, Wrong 
lkrns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984); 
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 11th Amendment: A Narrow Construction 
of at1 Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 
35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign 
Itnntrmity Doctrines (pts. 1 & 2), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1978), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1203 (1978). 
265 An individual action for damages against a state official may be defeated because 
of a qualified immunity that shields the defendant from liability for good faith violations 
of constitutional rights, except those that were clearly established at the time of the 
conduct which forms the basis of the cause of action. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982). See also supra note 125 and accompanying text. Given the lack of devel- 
opment of the right to safety for foster children, it is possible that a damage claim would 
fail on that ground, at least initially. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (right-to-safety case against state officials for failure 
to protect a child from known risk of harm by parent dismissed because right to 
protection is not clearly established). See also Comment, Defining the Scope of the Due 
Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith 
Immrmity, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 940 (1985). 
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doctrine269 barriers to recovery in actions that charge violations 
of federal constitutional rights ,"O or "constitutional 
Although there have been several recent ground-breaking 
opinions that appear to raise the possibility of liability,272 the 
impediments to recovery remain formidable. The number of 
money recoveries for foster care abuse is minuscule compared 
to the extent of actual abuse, and in those few cases in which 
judgments have been obtained, the amount of the judgment is 
quite low. Research has uncovered only four cases in which 
damages have been awarded on state-created tort actions for 
foster care abuse. The judgments granted in these cases range 
from a low of $4,500 for the death of a foster child to a high of 
$46,000. The total amount obtained for all of these cases is a 
paltry $85,500.273 Even if the outlook for damage actions were 
more promising, they have other serious drawbacks which make 
them unattractive vehicles for reform of the foster care sys- 
The next subsection explains why damage actions, even 
if theoretically obtainable, are not a promising avenue of reform. 
269 In a constitutional tort action a municipality is not liable for acts of its employees 
unless the actions were pursuant to a deliberate municipal policy. Monell v. Dep't of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This is not to say that recovery is impossible, as 
the Doe case discussed earlier shows. See supra notes 173, 175-77 and accompanying 
text. 
For a discussion of the various barriers to recovery for constitutional tort actions, 
see Spumer, Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or Worthless? Awards or Money 
Damages Under Section 1983,20 Tulsa L.J. 1,26 (1984). 
n1 "Constitutional torts" is the term used by Professor Christina Whitman to de- 
scribe such damage actions. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 7 
(1980). 
Several courts have rejected the doctrine of sovereign immunity and have al- 
lowed suits against states, counties, placement agencies or social workers to proceed. 
See supra note 249. Other courts have held that suits were not barred by parental 
immunity, since the foster parents were not considered to have loco parentis status. 
Andrews v. Ostego County, 112 Misc. 2d 37, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1982); Mayberry v. 
Pryor, 422 Mich. 579,374 N.W.2d 683 (1985). 
n3 Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (wrongful 
death, $4,500); Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) 
(wrongful death, damages of $20,000 plus funeral expenses and costs); Cathey v. Ber- 
nard, 467 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 1985) (wrongful death and survival action, total of $15,000 
awarded); Jenks v. State, 507 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1987) (case settled for $46,000). A 
review of reported tort damage awards contained in National Jury Verdict Review and 
Analysis failed to disclose any unofficially reported judgments. Even when the Doe 
case-the only other known award-is added, the total recovery from the American 
legal system for the extensive amount of abuse and neglect in foster care is only 
$310,500. 
n4 For a less pessimistic view of the case law, see Comment, supra note 10, at 
979-84. 
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B. The Inadequacy of Damage Actions 
Individual damage actions, even if available, are not useful 
mechanisms for obtaining reform. They tend to focus attention, 
myopically, on individual culpability for past actions instead of 
on detection and correction of institutional deficiencies that con- 
tribute to the maltreatment of foster children. By its nature, a 
claim for damages examines past wrongs. It seeks to compen- 
sate for an injury which has already occurred.275 By contrast, 
an equitable action for an injunction seeks to prevent harm from 
occurring in the first instance.276 
Because an individual damage action is concerned with the 
culpability of the assigned caseworker or foster parent for the 
abuse suffered by the child, rather than with the system itself, 
it is unlikely that a damage claim will bring attention to the root 
causes of the problem. It thus diverts attention from the real 
culprit in the drama: the state's failure to fund and maintain an 
adequate foster care system. 
With the real problem obscured, two contradictory and 
unhelpful tendencies compete for attention. The first is to shift 
blame for the danger to children onto overworked caseworkers 
or poorly selected and ill-trained foster parents.277 Such charges 
are often unfair as these people often lack the support or envi- 
ronment to do an acceptable job. Furthermore, this shift of focus 
diverts desperately needed funds from structural reform to in- 
dividual payments that change nothing in the system. 
Moreover, the fear of liability may influence qualified peo- 
ple who might otherwise be attracted to this form of public 
service to seek other kinds of work. Those who do enter or 
remain in the field may engage in what has been called "defen- 
sive social work,"278 a term referring to practices followed be- 
cause of a desire to avoid liability rather than to advance the 
interests of the ~hi ldren .~~9 Workers in the system may find 
275 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 (B)(i) (1979); P. Schuck, Suing Gov- 
ernments 15 (1983). 
276 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 (B)(i) (1979); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 
F.2d 226,241 (2d Cir. 1972); P. Schuck, supra note 275, at 15-16. 
2'7 See D. Besharov, The Vulnerable Social Worker 15,65, 133. Cf. Whitman, supra 
note 271, at 60. 
278 D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 138. Cf. Whitman, supra note 271, at 53. 
279 See D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 136-38. 
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themselves saddled with a conflict of interest: their understand- 
able desire to avoid personal liability versus the best interests 
of the children dependent on their services. This second ten- 
dency is even more dangerous than the first as it may lead 
courts, reluctant to impose liability upon "vulnerable" case- 
workers, foster parents, or agencies, to render decisions, such 
as K~epf,~~O that restrictively define the range of protections 
guaranteed to foster Another form s f  defensive so- 
cial work is immobilized decisionmaking. The whole system will 
collapse if liability precludes responsible decisionmaking in 
areas such as reporting and investigating suspected cases, the 
adequacy of foster parents, and termination of parental rights.282 
The final casualty of a regime focused solely on the question 
of individual responsibility is the loss of public education that 
attends a more broad-based examination of societal fault in the 
foster care system.283 For similar reasons, Professor Christine 
Whitman recommended that for civil rights actions generally, 
"the time has come to admit that equitable actions may be a 
[more] preferable form of judicial redress" than damage actions 
for the vindication of constitutional rights.284 Thus, even if the 
chances of obtaining damage awards were better, individual 
damage actions, which operate only after the injury has oc- 
curred, are not useful mechanisms for obtaining the structural 
reform of foster care systems that is needed to ensure the right 
to safety in foster care. Examination of the structural injunction, 
undertaken in the next section, demonstrates its superiority as 
a form of relief in the foster care area. 
~. 
C.  The Structural Injunction 
, ~ 
"Structural" or "institutional injunctions"285 grant broad, 
detailed relief as a remedy to constitutional violations in the 
280 Koepf v. County of York, 1 9 8 ~ e b .  67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977). 
Cf. Whitman, supra note 271, at 41-47. 
z8z Id. at 138. 
28) D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 159. 
284 Whitman, supra note 271, at 4748, But see Levine, Social Worker Malpractice: 
A New Approach Toward Accountability in the Juvenile Justice System, 1 J. JUV. L. 
101 (1977). 
2ss See, e.g., Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 Cardozo L. Rev. 611 (1983) 
(using the term "institutional injunctions" to describe equitable orders entered in cases 
involving state and mental institutions); Chayes, The Role of the Judgk in Public Law 
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operation of government-run services. The structural injunction 
focuses prospectively on changing organizational behavior.286 
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,287 and coming to 
maturity in later school desegregation cases,288 the structural 
injunction has since been used by federal courts in a wide variety 
of civil rights contexts.289 
Structural injunctions have been the subject of substantial 
j ud i~ i a l~9~  and scholarly291 comment, and remain highly contro- 
Litigation, 89 Haw. L. Rev. 1281, 1281-84 (1976) (terming the cases "Public Law" 
litigation); Robertson, supra note 119, at 146 (terming the relief ordered "Structural 
Injunctions Directed at Inmate Violence"); Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
Haw. L. Rev. 1 (1979) (terming the litigation "Structural Reform" litigation); Diver, The 
Jirdge as Political Po~verbroker: Superintending Structural CI~ange in Public Institu- 
tiorts, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43,49 (1979) (terming the cases "Institutional Reform" litigation); 
Note, Cotnplex Enforcentertt: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 Haw. L. Rev. 626 
(1981) (distinguishing cases seeking "complex enforcement" through a detailed injunc- 
tion to "transform a social institution" from "discrete adjudication," which involves 
only an application of legal forms to particular instances of wrongdoing). 
286 Robertson, supra note 119, at 146, and authorities cited therein. 
287 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown has been frequently mentioned 
as the progenitor of all modem structural injunction cases. See, e-g., Rudenstine, 
Jlrdicially Ordered Social Reform, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 451 (1986); Rosenberg & Phillips, 
Itutit~rtiottalization of Conflict in the Reform of Schools: A Case Study of Court Zmple- 
tttentatiort of tlte PARC Decree, 57 Ind. L.J. 425 (1982). 
See P. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation 
(1985); Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 Yale L.J. 
1700, 1709-12 (1986); Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegre- 
gation Consent Decrees, 95 Yale L.J. 1811 (1986). Important desegregation cases of the 
last decade include Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Columbus Bd. of Educ. 
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
289 See, e.g., Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1981) (institution for treatment 
of persons suffering from leprosy); French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind. 1982) 
(prisons); Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, 527 F.2d 
1041 (2d Cir. 1975) (jails); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977) 
(juvenile detention facility); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 @. Minn. 1974) aff'd 
itt part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (mental institution); New York State Ass'n for 
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (institution for the 
mentally retarded); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. 
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (special 
education). 
rw Compare, for example, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). At the close of the October 1986 term, four 
of the sitting justices generally opposed structural injunctions while four approved of 
them. Justice Scalia has yet to address this topic as a justice of the Supreme Court. 
Justice Powell's resignation will do nothing to lessen the controversy. For a discussion 
of the clash of views among the current justices, see Rudenstine, supra note 285. Lower 
federal judges have also addressed this topic. Lasker, Judicial Supervision of Institu- 
tiorla1 Refornt, 5 Crim. Just. Ethics 2, 79 (1986); Weinstein, The Effect of Austerity on 
Ittstitirtional Litigation, 6 L. and Hum. Behav. 145 (1982); Johnson, Observation - The 
Cortstitirtion and the Federal District Judge, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 903 (1976). 
191 Among the major works favoring the use of structural injunctions are A. Neier, 
sirpra note 14; Rudenstine, supra note 285; Eisenberg & Yazell, The Ordinary and the 
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versial. Opponents contend that they violate the separation of 
powers, erode federalism barriers, and compromise democratic 
principles. Supporters counter, often with arguments drawn 
from history, that the use of broad equitable federal injunctive 
powers does not represent a radical departure from the tradi- 
tional judicial role. But the criticism most often uttered in op- 
position to this form of relief is that "courts lack the expertise 
and administrative capacity necessary to improve"292 large ba- 
reaucratic governmental systems such as the foster care system. 
No doubt there are serious impediments to effective imple- 
mentation of a decree calling for safe treatment of foster chil- 
dren. Implementation may require substantial restructuring of a 
large, bureaucratic institution. Reform will require piercing the 
institutional veil, for unless the will to change is transmitted to 
the caseworkers who select and supervise the foster homes, and 
to the foster parents themselves, the right to safety will be a 
chirneraazg3 Moreover, organizational and psychological change 
alone will be insufficient. Safety will come only at a price. 
Increased appropriations will be needed to hire and train more 
and better-qualified caseworkers and foster parents and to pro- 
vide support services for foster parents and children.294 
The only remedy that holds significant promise of accom- 
plishing this feat is a structural injunction. In contrast to the 
limited possibilities for success with damage actions, the evi- 
dence suggests that structural injunctions do engender improve- 
ments. Of course, the benefits are not felt overnight; change is 
often measured by "inches and centimeters" rather than "leaps 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Ham. L. Rev. 465 (1980); Fiss, supra note 
285; Goldstein, A S~vann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 
Ham. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1978). Works criticizing this form of relief include Horowitz, 
Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 
Duke L.J. 1265; Diver, supra note 285; Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 
35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949 (1978); Fmg, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U .  Pa. 
L. Rev. 715 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable 
Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978). 
Comment. suora note 94. at 388. 
293 See supra noies 277-78 and accompanying text. See also Lowry, supra note 7, 
at 279. 
-~. 
294 See also Zeigler, supra note 13, at 40-42 (review of the authority that holds that 
inadequate resources cannot be used as an excuse to avoid compliance with constitu- 
tionally guaranteed rights). 
Heinonline - -  23  Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 2 5 3  1988 
254 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 23 
and bounds."295 The cases involving prison violence exemplify 
the successful use of structural injunctions.296 
In a law review article, Professor James E. Robertson re- 
cently surveyed the results of four prison cases in which struc- 
tural injunctions designed to reduce prison violence were ob- 
tained.297 He found that with the passage of time and vigorous 
efforts at implementation, the decrees "result[ed] in a significant 
lessening of prison violence."298 Similar results have been ob- 
tained in the implementation of structural injunctions dealing 
with other concerns. Prison systems in general have been re- 
shaped,299 and institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally 
retarded have been drastically altered.300 Moreover, the avail- 
able evidence on cases that have addressed educational issues 
indicates that compliance with judicially ordered reform is ob- 
"5 Rebell, Implementation of Court Mandates Concerning Special Education: The 
Problems arrd the Potential, 10 J.L. & Educ. 335,355 (1981). See also Note, The Wyatt 
Case: Implementations of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 Yale 
L.J. 1338; 1356 (1975). 
A decree seeking to reduce ~ r i son  violence is. if anvthina, more difficult to 
implement than one concerned with fister parent abuse and negiect. Prisons aretypically 
populated with adults who have demonstrated a proclivity for extreme violence. Rob- 
ertson, supra note 119, at 106. See also H. Toch, Police, Prisons and the Problems of 
Violence, 53 (1977), cited in Robertson, supra note 119. The existence of an active and 
violent prison subculture is well known and amply documented. Id. at 108-09 and 
authorities cited therein. If significant results can be obtained in that inherently volatile 
environment, then positive change should be possible in the more benign setting of 
foster family care. Although it is true that the state has less control over the happenings 
in a civilian foster home than in the highly regimented setting of a prison, there are 
ample means available for the control of violence in foster care. See supra notes 53-65 
and accompanying text. If these safeguards are followed, there is every reason to believe 
that foster care mistreatment can be greatly minimized with less effort than would be 
required to achieve safety in prisons. 
" Robertson, supra note 119, at 146-55. 
D8 Id. at 154. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14 (D.P.R. 1979). 
Feliciarlo involved the Puerto Rico prison system. In 1981-82, there were 49 deaths and 
75 serious injuries in the Puerto Rico prison system. By 1983-84, the numbers had 
declined to one death and 17 serious injuries, one-seventh the rate prior to the judgment. 
Robertson, supra note 119, at 153, citing a letter from Cirilo Castro Penaloza, Acting 
Administrator, Administration de Correccion, Puerto Rico (Undated, postmarked Feb. 
1985); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. 
Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.P.R. 1977), 
remarrded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), aff 'd,  616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 839 (1980). 
299 See generally M .  Hanis & D. Spiller, After Decision: Implementation of Judicial 
Decrees in Correctional Settings (1977). 
J* See D. Rothman & S. Rothman, supra note 120 (successful implementation of 
the Willowbrook remedial decree resulted in the community placement of half of the 
facility's residents; it also brought about positive changes in the state's policy regarding 
the care of retarded persons). 
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tainable.301 In all these areas, the initial recalcitrance of defen- 
dants to obey the decree was overcome by patient, yet persis- 
tent, efforts by  courts and by -plaintiffs' attorneys. 
Structural injunctions tend to bring benefits which are 
broader than those strictly related to literal compliance with 
court orders. The "focused compulsion"302 engendered by a 
structural law suit causes policy makers to attend to problems 
that they would otherwise ignore.303 Moreover, the cases t h m -  
selves ~ may "sensitize . . . the public . . . to the need for . . . 
reform."3w By serving the traditional federal judicial role of the 
community's "sensitive conscience,"30s the courts have stimu- 
lated other branches of government to act responsively to the 
needs highlighted by the decrees.306 In the child welfare field, 
this "informing function"307 of institutional litigation would be 
particularly valuable. Structural injunctions, despite the diffi- 
culty of enforcement, would "focus attention on the systemic 
nature of problems plaguing child welfare."308 
Even if the potential benefits of the structural injunction 
were less clear, the case for granting structural injunctions 
would~still be compelling. Given the lack of realistic alterna- 
tives,309 it would be a default of constitutional responsibility for 
301 M. Rebel1 & A. Block, Educational Policy Making and the Courts 65 (1982) 
(compliance achieved in most of 41 randomly selected education decrees not involving 
desegregation). The results of school desegregation decrees are less clear. Compare 
United States Civil Rights Commission, Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law: 
Desegregation of the Nation's Schools, Letter of Transmittal (1976) (communities in 
which desegregation proceeds without major incident far outnumber those like Boston 
and Louisville) with H. Kalodner & I. Fishman, Limits of Justice: The Court's Role in 
School Desegregation (1978) (case studies of several school desegregation cases where 
the level of compliance was minimal). The spotty results in school desegregation cases 
may be explained by their high visibility and the tremendous amount of opposition they 
receive. 
Un Rebell, supra note 295, at 344 n.26. 
M3 Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 Ala. L. 
Rev. 271,273-79 (1981). 
UU Comment, supra note 94, at 392. See also Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Move- 
ment and Its Impacts: 1960-80, in N. Moms & M. Tonry, Crime and Justice: An Annual 
Review of Research 459 (1981). 
3a( Weinstein, supra note 290, at 151. 
306 Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 428,463 (1977). Fpr an example of how this phenomenon has already occured in 
foster care litigation, see infra note 388 and accompanying text. 
A. Neier, supra note 14, at 237. 
D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 159. See also Lowry supra note 7, at 275. 
See supra notes 81-92. 
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the courts not to attempt to enforcefoster children's crucial 
constitutional right to safety. One commentator, who surveyed 
the somewhat disappointing results of the federal courts' efforts 
to achieve desegregation in our nation's schools, observed not 
long ago that "[flor all the faults that have characterized adju- 
dication, it is not possible to conceive of a constitutional system 
in which no institution of government is prepared to declare and 
enforce constitutional rights."310 Structural injunctions are 
clearly the remedy of choice for the problem of violence in 
foster care. The question arises as to the appropriate forum for 
assertion of such claims. The next section addresses that 
question. 
V. The Search for a Forum 
Both federal and state courts have jurisdiction to entertain 
right-to-safety cases.311 But, if a structural injunction is the pref- 
erable remedy to enforce the right to safety against foster care 
violence, federal courts are the better forum in which to vindi- 
cate that right. Federal courts historically have been called upon 
to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from encroach- 
ments by state officials. While state courts have in recent years 
become more active participants in the dialogue of constitutional 
adjudication,312 they lack the institutional attributes necessary 
to overcome the bureaucratic and political obstacles to the 
achievement of a safe foster care system. This section discusses 
the superiority of federal courts as a forum for right-to-safety 
cases and explains why two abstention doctrines that operate 
to close federal courts to some claims-the domestic relations 
exception and the Younger v. Harris doctrine-are not appli- 
cable to right-to-safety cases. 
]I0 H. Kalodner & J. Fishman, supra note 301, at 23. 
"1 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (section 1983 actions may be brought 
in the state courts). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); M. 
Schwartz & J. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees 15 (1986). 
3'2 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); Collins, Looking to the States, Nat'l L.J., S-2 (Sept. 29, 
1986). See,also Recent Developments in State Constitutional Law (P. Bamberger ed. 
1985). 
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A. The Superiority of Federal Courts 
Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, federal courts have been seen as the 
"fundamental protectors of . . . federal rights."313 The primary 
basis for confidence in the federal courts in this role is the 
protection provided by the Article I11 requirement of lifetime 
appointment for federal judgese314 This requ-bment largely in- 
sulates the federal judiciary from the political process, giving 
federal judges the level of independence needed to counter the 
majoritarian tendencies-expressed through elected 
official~~~~-to tolerate a substandard system of foster care. 
Since state judges often lack this electoral independen~e,~'~ they 
are subject to political pressures that dilute their ability to order 
and supervise reform of state institutions, such as the foster 
care system.317 Unlike a case where a single individual,is raising 
a,single constitutional issue, the judge in a foster care reform 
case is asked to oversee the fundamental restructuring of a major 
social. service system in order to guarantee an entire class es- 
sential constitutional rights.318 
Staying power and independence are central to redressing 
the injustices of foster care systems. The deficiencies in foster 
care are not easily correctable; they arise in large part because 
of bureaucratic inertia and a lack of commitment by elected 
officials to the allocation of sufficient resources to provide the 
services truly needed to protect the children in care. It is all too 
easy for legislators to forget the needs of foster children when 
313 M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial-Power 1 
(1980). See also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,541 (1983) (continued to recognize the 
importance of a federal forum for the protection of federal rights); Mitchum v. Foster, 
407 U.S. 225 (1972) (reemphasized that federal courts play a crucial role in the protection 
of federal rights); Whitman, supra note 271, at 24 n.114 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 105 (1980). See also Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987). 
314 U.S. Const. art. 111, § 1 ("The judges . . . shall hold their offices during good 
behavior."). See also Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Ham. L. Rev. 1105, 1127-28 
(1977) (removal only by impeachment means maximum insulation from majority 
pressures). 
31Weuborne, supra note 314, at 1127-28. 
316 Sfate judges are ordinarily elected for a fixed term. See generally Neuborne; 
supra note 314, at 1122. 
317 Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1127-28 and authorities cited therein. 
318 See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text. 
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lobbyists press them for more popular services such as police, 
fire protection and education. 
There are other reasons why federal courts provide a su- 
perior forum to state courts for foster care right-to-safety cases. 
First, state judges, as a group, are less likely to be as f a d i a r  
with federal law as federal judges are.319 Most of the state judge's 
time is spent adjudicating claims that arise solely under a par- 
ticular state's laws. In contrast, federal judges spend the bulk 
of their time adjudicating federal claims. For this reason, federal 
judges have much greater familiarity with federal constitutional 
problems.320 Second, federal judges tend to have what Professor 
Neuborne terms a "psychological set"321 that. disposes them. to 
be more receptive to constitutional claims. They are "heirs of a 
tradition of constitutional enforcement."322 
Without the familiarity with federal law, support and time, 
environment of receptivity, and the political independence that 
characterize the federal judiciary, it is difficult to envision con- 
sistent, appropriate decisions in foster care right-to-safety cases. 
This is not to say that state judges are uniformly unable to handle 
competently foster care reform cases. In fact, there are in-: 
stances in which state judges have done so.323 However, given 
the added obstacles that they must overcome to achieve the 
results required, foster care reform cases belong in federal 
c o ~ r t . ~ ~ 4  The following section examines whether either of two 
3 1 ~  Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1121-24. 
Iz0 M. Redish, supra note 313, at 2. Another reason that the federal courts seem 
better suited to address the right-to-safety cases is that the work load of state judges is 
much greater than that of their federal colleagues. Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1122. 
s2' Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1124. 
JZ2 Id. 
323 E.g., 111 re P., No. 78J04583 and No. 78J04584, slip. op. (Ky. 1983), cited in 
Moraine, Making Foster Care Work, 4 Cal. Law. 24, 53 (1984); Palmer v. Cuomo, 121 
A.D.2d 194,503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1986). 
It has been argued that there is empirical support for the notion of parity between 
federal and state courts. Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and 
State Corrrts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 
(1983). The data from that study, however, do not support the conclusion that state 
courts are as competent to handle class action right-to-safety claims for structural 
injunctive relief as are federal courts. The data were drawn from reported decisions 
without apparent differentiation between individual and class claims, or between estab- 
lished and as-yet-unestablished rights. Id. at 238. Individual adjudications of established 
rights differ from the class claims of previously unrecognized rights pertinent to the 
problem of foster care abuse. In such uncharted waters, the sympathy, independence 
and expertise of federal judges is especially important. Whitman, supra note 271, at 24 
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major abstention doctrines would prevent the federal courts 
from examining foster care reform cases. 
B. Abstention Is Inappropriate in Right-to-Safety Cases 
In Younger v. Harris,32S the Supreme Court gave new life 
to an abstention doctrine applicable to civil rights cases.326 The 
Younger doctrine is an exception to the general duty of federal 
courts to enforce federal law and "fearlessly federal 
constitutional rights from encroachment by state 
Younger instructs district courts to refrain from adjudicating 
properly presented federal constitutional issues when the relief 
sought would result in halting a state criminal proceeding, unless 
plaintiffs can demonstrate "extraordinary  circumstance^."^^^ As 
long as federal plaintiffs have an opportunity to present their 
claim in the state criminal trial, and are not suffering irreparable 
injury, then the federal court should abstain.330 Justice Black 
explained that "Our Federa l i~m"~~~ is the driving force behind 
n.114. In addition, the authors report that federal courts uphold federal claims in a 
greater percentage of cases than do state courts. Solirnine & Walker, supra, at 240, 
table 11 (federal courts uphold federal claims in 41% of cases, compared with 32% in 
state courts). For the views of other commentators who favor the availability of federal 
forums for vindication of federal rights, see Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's 
Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 647-50 (1987); Mishkin, The Fed- 
eral "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157,168 (1953). For a contrary 
view, see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 605 (1981). 
32s 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
326 The abstention doctrine now commonly associated with Younger traces its roots 
back to In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See generally Zeigler, An Accommodation 
of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional 
Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U .  Pa. L. Rev. 266,269-82 (1976) (tracing 
the history of the nonintervention doctrine of Younger and arguing that the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the doctrine diiers during periods of judicial activism and 
judicial restraint). 
3n Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980). 
328 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972) (The Court described federal courts 
"as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional 
action under color of state law."). See also Morial v. Judiciary Comm. of La., 565 F.2d 
295,298-99 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
329 Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 
330 Id. at 43-45. 
Id. at 44. 
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the d0ctrine.33~ The Supreme Court has steadily enlarged the 
boundaries of this highly controversial doctrine by holding that 
the underlying policies dictate restraining federal involvement 
not only when state criminal proceedings are pending, but also 
during civil proceedings in which the state is a party in its 
"sovereign 
Indeed, the doctrine creates an enclave of virtual immunity 
from lower court enforcement of federal constitutional rights. 
Federal courts have justified the application of the Younger 
doctrine as necessary to prevent the unseemliness of allowing a 
state court defendant to come "running into federal court seek- 
ing an adjudication of his rights andlor an injunction halting the 
criminal pro~ecution."3~~ To permit federal jurisdiction in such 
a case is considered undesireable because it would seem to 
imply that the state judiciary is unable or unwilling to enforce 
federal rights.335 In addition, the bifurcation of the state case 
'j2 Two other forms of abstention in use in federal courts today do not apply to 
right-to-safety cases or would require expansion of existing doctrines to apply: Pullman 
abstention and Burford abstention. See Railroad Comm'r of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Pullman only applies 
when one case raises both a federal constitutional question and an unclear question of 
state law, the resolution of which might modify the federal question or obviate the need 
to decide it. A right-to-safety case generally raises only a federal issue. Moreover, 
applying Pullmatt abstention would require waiting for the state court's decision on the 
state issues hypothetically involved, decisions that could theoretically remain pending 
during the child's entire time in foster care and permitting the harm to the foster child 
to persist. 
Similarly, Burford abstention, in which the federal court defers to the state court 
to avoid interference with complex state administrative activities, usually by dismissing 
the action, would be inapplicable in right-to-safety cases. The Burford doctrine had 
been designed to apply to administrative actions, while right-to-safety cases deal with 
judicial issues, 319 U.S. at 332. See generally C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 
5 52 (4th ed. 1983) (describing four variations of the abstention doctrine); Redish, 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 
71 (1984). 
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 432, 444 (1977). Over the years, the Supreme 
Court has applied the doctrine to civil proceedings in which the state seeks civil 
enforcement, id., proceedings regulating the conduct of attorneys, Middlesex County 
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), proceedings dealing 
with civil contempt, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), proceedings concerning child 
custody, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) and, most recently, proceedings dealing 
with posting bonds pending appeal in a purely private case, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). 
3" Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1980). 
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (stressed that federal 
court interference with a state's process is "an offense to the State's interest," and "can 
readily be interpreted 'as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce 
constitutional principles."'), reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. 
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that results when federal courts take jurisdiction of a case al- 
ready in a state court threatens to throw the administration of ' 
state criminal justice into confusion.336 
The doctrine's boundaries were enlarged in Moore v. 
S i r n ~ . ~ ~ ~  There a sharply divided Court applied the Younger 
abstention doctrine to state child-protection proceedings. The 
plaintiffs in Moore were suspected of abusing their children. 
State officials had removed the children from school and placed 
them involuntarily in foster care, without notice to the parents 
and without a hearing pursuant to the Texas Family Code Act. 
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of several sections 
of the After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a 
hearing before the state courts, plaintiffs turned to federal court 
and secured injunctive relief.339 The Supreme Court, however, 
found that the district court should have abstained, as the en- 
joined state court proceedings touched on matters which are "a 
traditional area of state concern."340 Because the state has a 
vital interest in "quickly and effectively removing the victims 
of child abuse from their parents,"341 and because the child 
protection proceedings, under state abuse and neglect laws, are 
"in aid of and closely related to state criminal statutes,"342 the 
Court held that the Younger doctrine was applicable. Finding 
none of the exceptions to the doctrine satisfied, the Court or- 
dered abstention.343 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) 
(applying the Younger doctrine to halt the federal court's interference in the state 
contempt process). 
But see, e.g., Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Hams: Deference in Search of 
a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463,482-84 (1978) (rejecting the need for deference to 
avoid insulting state courts). 
"Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1979) 
(noting that when federal courts intervene, they deprive the state judiciary of an op- 
portunity to develop state policy); Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal 
Courts, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 59 (1981). 
337 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
338 Sections of chapters 11, 14, 15, 17, and 34 in Title 2 of the Texas Family Code 
were challenged. See Note, Moore v. Sims: A Further Expansion of the Younger 
Abstention Doctrine, 1 Pace L. Rev. 149 (1980). 
339 Moore. 442 U.S. at 418-22. 
340 ~ d .  at 435. 
Id. (quoting Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (S.D. 
Tex. 197711. 
BZ 1d:'at 423, (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)). 
343 Id. at 433-35. 
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Although Moore v. Sims concerned an attempt by parents 
to regain custody of their children, courts have since interpreted 
the decision as requiring the application of the Younger principle 
to all family court proceedings.344 While one must therefore ask 
whether the Younger doctrine applies or should apply to foster 
child right-to-safety cases, an examination of the policies un- 
derlying the doctrine reveals that the answer is no. The Younger 
doctrine developed as a response to special cases where the 
state's interest in enforcement of its own laws outweighs the 
strong federal interest in the federal court enforcement of federal 
constitutional rights.345 In right-to-safety cases, the important 
constitutional rights at stake outweigh any possible interference 
with the state's law enforcement interests. In such a context, 
the balance tips against Younger abstention because the predi- 
cate for the doctrine's applicability is missing. 
Federal prison reform cases provide an appropriate anal- 
ogy. Cases concerning prison conditions have never been con- 
sidered subject to the Younger doctrine,346 primarily because 
plaintiffs in these cases do not seek to overturn their convictions 
or to shorten their incarceration. Thus, federal involvement in 
these cases does not interfere with any pending state proceed- 
ings. The same is true of foster care right-to-safety cases, which 
concern the quality, not the existence of the placement. 
The analogy to prison cases, however, is not perfect. Unlike 
prisoners, whose case is closed upon conviction, foster children 
remain subject to judicial proceedings,347 even if their parents 
344 Id. at 425,430. District courts have based their opinions on a broad understanding 
of Moore. See, e.g., Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439,44346 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 
334-35 (1977). 
H6 In the few prison cases that have dealt with abstention issues, Younger abstention 
has been rejected. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,525 @.C. Cir. 1978) (abstention 
did not prevent federal court from granting injunctive relief to pretrial detainees in case 
of unconstitutional facility conditions); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th 
Cir, 1980) (prison conditions case where Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention 
were held to be inappropriate). 
~4~Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (states must institute 
a procedure whereby review of the child's placement occurs at least once every eighteen 
months); Social Security Act § 47(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. ,§ 67(a)(l) (Supp. 1981) (the purpose 
of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 is to expeditiously either 
return the child to his parents, or to arrange for the child's adoption). See, e.g.. N.Y. 
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have consented to placement. The child's case will generally 
remain available for family court review during the time the 
child is in foster care.348 The difference between a foster care 
case and a prison conditions case, then, is that a foster care 
right-to-safety case touches on collateral areas that, at least 
theoretically, are usually within the purview of cases already in 
state courts. 
The Supreme Court has sent contradictory messages 
whether Younger applies to such collateral matters. On one 
hand, in O'Shea v. little tor^,^^^ the Court approved application 
of the abstention doctrine where the relief sought would broadly 
affect state criminal court judicial practices and procedures.350 
On the other hand, in Gerstein v. P ~ g h , 3 ~ l  the Court refused to 
apply Younger to an action seeking preliminary hearings for a 
class of pre-trial detainees.352 Lower courts attempting to distin- 
guish Gerstein and O'Shea have reached seemingly irreconcil- 
able results.353 The agony of their efforts may explain what 
Soc. Sew. Law 8 392 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1986) and infra note 348 and accompanying 
text (a reviewing body may inquire into the child's foster care placement and order 
improvement if needed). 
"8 M. Hardin, Foster Children in the Courts 623 (1983). See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 
§ 392(10) (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1986) (requires the court to possess continuing juris- 
diction in the case of children who are continued in foster care; rehearings must occur 
at least every twenty-four months). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 43-15-13 (Supp. 1986); 
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 8 18 (Vernon 1986). 
349 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
350 Id. at 500-01 (even though the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin any pending 
criminal proceeding, the Court held that the relief sought-+ day-to-day audit of state 
court practices-was within the Younger prohibition since it would have thrust the 
federal court into the role of "receiver" of the state court system). 
351 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
352 Id. at 108 n.9. 
353 Lower federal courts have consistently found Younger applicable to collateral 
challenges to the absence of a hearing or standards in state bail-setting procedures, 
Muda v. Busse, 437 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind. 1977); to the use of social histories prior 
to adjudication in family court juvenile delinquency proceedings, J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 
F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981); to the absence of appointed counsel in child support contempt 
matters, Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); and to failure to adjourn a criminal 
trial on Friday, which the defendant observed as his sabbath, N.J. v. Chesmard, 555 
F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1977). However, other courts have determined that Younger is not 
implicated when the collateral attack is on preventive detention practices of family court 
judges, Coleman v. Stanziam, 570 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1983), app. dismissed, 735 
F.2d 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984), or concerns the right to bail 
pending appeal of a criminal conviction, Abbott v. Laurie, 422 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 
1976), or relates to the practice of indefinitely confining a juvenile pursuant to an unclear 
family court order, A.T. v. County of Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
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prompted then-Justice Rehnquist to comment that the Court's 
Younger-based decisions map a "sinuous path."3S4 
The path is easier to follow in right-to-safety cases. In every 
case in which a federal court has abstained from examining a 
federal claim on Younger grounds because, as a collateral mat- 
ter, the claim involved a family court case, the federal claim 
involved an attack on the procedures followed by the state 
c~urt.~~"t least for foster care cases, there is a relevant dis- 
tinction between Gerstein and O'Shea. Gerstein was directed 
not at state criminal prosecutions, but at the narrow legality of 
pre-trial detention without a probable cause hearing.356 O'Shea, 
on the other hand, was a broad-based attack on the Cairo, 
Illinois, criminal justice system.357 Since right-to-safety cases do 
not challenge state court procedures, a foster care right-to-safety 
case bears a greater similarity to Gerstein than to O'Shea, be- 
cause it challenges only the legality of the conditions of foster 
care, not the placement proceedings themselves. 
When a federal court changes the procedures to be used in 
a state proceeding by, for example, ordering the appointment of 
counsel in a support order it comes dangerously 
close to intruding on the overriding state interest in conducting 
its own judicial proceedings. Younger is designed, in part, to 
avoid federal displacement of the state court "in supervising the 
conduct of trials in state This displacement can occur 
when the federal challenge is to a collateral matter. The effect 
of a federal injunction which alters a state procedure is to trans- 
, 
fer control of the case from a judge in one system to a judge in 
another system.360 Such a transfer can create the same type of 
confusion and inefficiency as would an injunction against the 
state proceeding itself. 
15' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 459,479 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
JJJ See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text. 
JS6 420 U.S. at 108. 
JJ7 414 U.S. at 499. 
JJ8 Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980). 
359 N.J. v. Chesmard, 555 F.2d at 68 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Jm See also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir. 1981) (allowing federal 
suits would "clearly interfere" with the procedures of the juvenile court system); Brown 
v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 448 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (observing that without the Younger 
application, a party would continually move to stop a procedure, never allowing an 
action to get to court). 
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Equitable relief in right-to-safety cases does not pose these 
dangers. A federal court order to improve a foster care system 
in no way interferes with the local family court process. It 
neither dictates the procedures that the state court should follow 
nor limits the range of disposition alternatives that the state 
judge may consider. The overriding purpose of a family court 
foster care proceeding is to determine whether or not foster care 
placement is necessary, and, if it is, to determine when and by 
what means it should be terminated.361 That purpose is not 
disturbed by a right-to-safety injunction. The state's interest in 
the integrity of its own proceedings, therefore, is not compro- 
mised by federal injunctive relief protecting the safety of foster 
children. Indeed, relief not only leaves intact the state interest 
in protecting children, but also enhances it by improving the 
quality of the foster care program.362 
Lower federal courts confronting Younger issues in family 
court and foster care matters have applied the doctrine in a 
manner consistent with this analysis. Thus, cases seeking to 
enjoin the use of certain family court procedures have been 
dismissed,363 but the courts have refused to apply Younger 
where, as in a right-to-safety case, the plaintiff does not seek to 
enjoin the state proceeding or to interfere with family court 
proceedings .364 
M. Hardin, supra note 348, at 86; Gattenberger, Foster Placement Review: 
Problems and Opportunities, 83 Dick. L. Rev. 487, 491 (1979) (footnote omitted). See 
also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, 8 26 (Law Co-op Supp. 1987); N.Y. Soc. Sew. 
Law 1 392 (Consol. 1984); Ohio Rev. Code Ann, § 5103.151 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 
1986); Va. Code Ann. 8 16.1-282 (1950 & Supp. 1987). 
~2 62.H. V. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1981). The mere existence of an 
available, but unutilized, state forum has never been enough to authorize Younger 
abstention. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal remedy for constitutional injury is 
supplemental to the state remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Blackrnun, 
Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain 
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
X3 See, e-g., L.H. v. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cu. 1981); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 
F.2d 1080 (6th Cu. 1981); Haag v. Cuyahoga County, 619 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio 
1985); Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
-See, e.g., L.H. v. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1981); A.T. v. County of 
Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. Ill. 1985). A.T. and L.H. are illustrative. In A.T., the 
plaintiff sought release from the indefinite confinement that resulted when he was 
confined pursuant to a family court order that allowed him to be "released upon request 
of the child's parent or other responsible adult." 613 F. Supp. at 776. The court held 
that Younger was not applicable because plaintiffs challenged what happened after the 
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There are two additional reasons why Younger should not 
relegate right-to-safety cases to the state courts. Younger does 
not apply either when there is no adequate remedy in the state 
court proceeding or when the plaintiff is suffering great and 
immediate irreparable harm.365 In the right-to-safety context, 
both exceptions to Younger usually apply. First, a single family 
court judge, in a single case, is unlikely to have either the 
perspective or the authority to fashion relief that will improve 
the quality of the foster care system. The only question normally 
considered by the judge (and the only one that can be consid- 
ered) is whether the child belongs in foster care, and, if so, 
when and under what conditions release is appropriate.366 This 
yes-no, in-out approach is very different from what a right-to- 
safety decision requires. In such cases, a judge must consider 
not simply the child's status, but also the quality of the child's 
placement in the foster care system. Most state statutes provide 
neither procedures nor remedial power for family court judges 
to address these questions.367 
Second, foster children do suffer great and immediate ir- 
reparable harm when their right to safety is violated. Unlike a 
Younger situation, where the cost, anxiety and inconvenience 
of having to defend against a criminal charge does not qualify 
family court judge had ruled. The injunction requested, therefore, did not duplicate, 
disrupt or insult the state judiciary. Id. at 778. 
In L.H., the plaintiff class sought additional funding for private agencies that care 
for children in the state's custody. The court refused to dismiss on Younger grounds 
even though there were foster care review proceedings, in which plaintiffs could have 
raised this claim, pending for all members of plaintiff class. The court noted that plaintiffs 
were not seeking to enjoin those proceedings. It also found that the relief requested 
"may enrich the variety of disposition alternatives available to a juvenile court judge." 
643 F.2d at 1354. 
M5 Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. 
See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
367 Section 392 of New York's Social Service Law is an example of how little a 
family court judge can do to improve safety for foster children during placement. Family 
courts have four options: they can return the child to his parent, free the chid for 
adoption, continue the existing foster care, or direct the adoption in the foster family 
home itself. Application of Social Services Official, 89 A.D.2d 534, 452 N.Y.S.2d 612 
(1982); Zti re L., 77 Misc. 2d 363, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317, modified on other grounds, 45 
A.D.2d 375,357 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1974). Family courts are not given the task of overseeing 
an agency's efforts and should avoid substituting theirjudgment for the commissioner's. 
They should not choose between adequate plans or design their own plans, but should 
merely satisfy themselves that the placement plans of the Commissioner are adequate. 
It1 re Damon A., 61 N.Y.2d 77, 459 N.E.2d 1275, 471 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1983); In re 
Commissioner of Social Services ex rel. Riddle v. Rapp, 127 Misc. 2d 835,487 N.Y.S.2d 
477 (1985). 
Heinonline - -  23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 2 6 6  1988 
19881 Constitutional Protection of Foster Children 267 
as a great and immediate irreparable harm, and unlike the pos- 
sibility of having a child removed from parental custody during 
the pendency of the action,36s violations of the right to safety 
cannot be rectified or minimized by subsequent review. When 
safety is at stake, every moment counts. Loss of life itself may 
be at stake--certainly, health and emotional well being are.369 
With the potential damage so great, the Younger rationale for 
delay is not persuasive.370 
Younger, therefore, cannot bar a right-to-safety case in the 
foster care field any more than it bars a right-to-safety case 
involving prisoners. The policies that have led federal courts to 
close their doors to a limited number of federal constitutional 
cases are not contravened by right-to-safety cases. For the fed- 
eral courts to abstain in such cases is for them to abdicate their 
responsibility to enforce federal rights. 
C. The Domestic Relations Exception is not a Jurisdictional 
Barrier to Right-to-Safety Cases 
"Poorly defined and unevenly applied,"371 the domestic re- 
lations exception is a judge-made doctrine which permits federal 
courts to decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction when to do 
so might embroil them in family disputes. In its most extreme 
expression of the concept, the Supreme Court described the 
doctrine as impelled by the notion that "[tlhe whole subject of 
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent andechild, 
belong to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United 
States ."372 
Several rationales have been offered for the doctrine, which 
constitutes a major restriction of federal jurisdiction. It has been 
xa Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; Moore, 442 U.S. at 434-35. 
369 See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. 
370 Youngerjustified its abstention rule by, among other things, assuming that courts 
of equity should not act in a restraining manner if the "moving party has an adequate 
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." 401 U.S. 
at 43-44. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-42 (1977) (resting on the 
assumption that subsequent review and remedy at law can, except in the face of great 
and immediate injury, satisfactorily ameliorate any h a m  done to the moving party). 
Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: To~vard a Principled Ex- 
ercise of Jurisdiction, 35 Hastings L.J. 571, 573 (1984). 
'7~ In re Bums,  136 U.S. 586,593-94 (1890). 
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said that the domestic relations exception is justified by the 
strong state interest in family law matters, by the state courts' 
superior competence in divorce and custody cases,373 and by a 
fear of the possibility of incompatible decrees in divorce and 
child custody cases involving continuing judicial supervision.374 
Some federal courts also have expressed discomfort at the pros- 
pect of becoming involved in these often acrimonious 
proceedings.375 
The doctrine is generally confined to diversity jurisdiction 
cases where, absent the doctrine, a state law claim could be 
brought in federal court solely because the parties reside in 
different states. On occasion, however, federal courts have de- 
clined to adjudicate claims involving domestic disputes even 
when they are otherwise properly brought under the federal 
question jurisdiction of the federal courts.376 A recent panel 
opinion of the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the domestic 
relations doctrine might apply in a right-to-safety case.377 But 
the doctrine, which has dubious credentials in any setting,378 
has no place in right-to-safety cases. 
J7J See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); Phillips, Nizer, 
Benjamin, Krim and Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting C. 
Wright, Federal Courts 84 (2d ed. 1970)). 
374 See, e.g., Lloyd v. LoefRer, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that 
"the exercise of federal jurisdiction will create a potential for inconsistent decrees"); 
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 E2d 842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981) ("there is an obvious likelihood of 
incompatible state and federal decrees"). 
See, e.g., Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) ("vexatious" 
field of family law warrants separate courts; "the federal court system should allow 
[state courts] that dubious honor exclusively"); see also Wand, A Call for the Repudia- 
tion of the Domestic Relation Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 307, 
385-87 (1975). 
376 See, e.g., Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[tlhere is no 
subject matter jurisdiction over these types of domestic disputes"); Zak v. Pilla, 698 
F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1982) (even a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 should be 
"dismissed by a federal district court for lack of jurisdiction"). But see Franks v. Smith, 
717 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[tlhe mere fact that a claimed violation of constitu- 
tional rights arises in a domestic relations context does not bar review of those consti- 
tutional issues"). The Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the domestic relations 
exception does not apply to cases brought under federal question jurisdiction. However, 
the Court has not invoked this exception in cases challenging the constitutionality of a 
child's placement or treatment in foster care. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 
(1979); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
Jn Taylor v. Ledbetter, 791 F.2d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part on rehearing, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
378 See Atwood, supra note 371; Wand, supra note 375; Comment, Federal Juris- 
diction and tile Domestic Relations Exception: A Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. 
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After Erie Railroad v. Torz~pkins,~~~ a federal court's only 
substantive concern in most diversity cases is to apply state law 
in an even-handed manner.380 In that limited context, the do- 
mestic relations exception, despite its questionable pedigree, 
serves reasonably well. Without it, a potential out-of-state liti- 
gant in a state divorce or custody matter could escape adjudi- 
cation of her dispute in the state tribunal to which it is assigned 
by state law. For example, if litigants, in such an instance, can 
avoid the state tribunal, the potential for disruption and ineffi- 
ciency is greater than when a tort action is brought in federal 
court. Unlike tort or contract matters, family law enforcement 
is generally entrusted to a specialized trib~nal,3~l and family law 
cases often involve emotional matters of unique state concern.382 
In domestic relations matters, the risk of inconsistent adjudi- 
cations by judges untrained in the intricacies of local law--ever- 
present in all diversity jurisdiction cases-becomes too high a 
price to pay for the theoretically impartial forum that diversity 
jurisdiction is designed to obtain. 
The balance, however, changes significantly when the liti- 
gation is brought to vindicate federal rights. No longer must the 
court weigh the relative importance of an impartial federal forum 
for the adjudication of a pure state law claim against the disrup- 
tion to the state system caused by the provision of the alterna- 
Rev. 843 (1984); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A 
Re-Evaluation, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 661 (1983). Much of the criticism of the exception (which 
originated from dicta in two Supreme Court opinions) questions whether the exception 
is justified. Atwood, supra note 371, at 592-93; Wand, supra note 375, at 359-85; Note, 
supra, at 684-91. Critics have also condemned the inconsistent application of the ex- 
ception. Atwood, supra note 371, at 573; Wand, supra note 380, at 387; Comment, 
supra, at 855-72; Note, supra, at 676-84. 
Although authorities debate whether the exception should be redefined or abolished, 
most agree that it should not extend to cases brought under federal question jurisdiction. 
Wand, supra note 375, at 392; Comment, supra, at 882; Atwood, supra note 371, at 
626. An extension of this sort would preclude federal courts from deciding important 
constitutional issues that were intended to be within their jurisdiction. Wand, supra 
note 375, at 392-93; Comment, supra, at 882-83. 
379 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
mZd. at 71 (previously "the laws of the several States" under section 34 of the 
Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789 did not include common law). 
381 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 284 (1968); 
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974). 
382 An example is the Baby " M  case, involving surrogate parenting arrangements. 
In re Baby " M ,  217 N.J. Super. 313,525 A.2d 1128 (1987), cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140, 
526 A.2d 203 (1987). 
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tive forum. In right-to-safety cases, the clash is between the 
overriding duty of federal courts to enforce and uphold consti- 
tutional rights, and the state's interest in having its courts hear 
these cases. The addition of the federal constitutional compo- 
nent changes the result of the abstention inquiry. 
Federal courts should be most sensitive to their insti- 
tutional responsibility to accept jurisdiction assigned to 
them by Congress when considering domestic relations 
cases that raise substantial federal constitutional or 
statutory claims. The domestic relations limitation, of 
dubious validity even in diversity cases, is wholly in- 
appropriate in. actions founded on a federal question.383 
Accordingly, most courts and commentators take the position 
that the domestic relations exception is appropriately restricted 
to diversity cases.384 
There is another reason why the doctrine should not apply 
in right-to-safety cases on behalf of foster children: none of the 
principles that the domestic relations exception is designed to 
uphold are threatened by the invocation of federal jurisdiction. 
The right to safety concerns the quality, not the fact or the 
duration, of a child's placement in foster family care. The artic- 
ulation and maintenance of this right by federal courts will not 
interfere with divorce cases, intrude on competency regarding 
family matters or have a major impact on child custody 
arrangements.38S 
Thus, since there are no genuine obstacles to the provision 
of a federal forum for the vindication of a foster child's federally 
secured constitutional right to safety, and since a structural 
injunction granted by a federal court is the preferred remedy, 
the concluding section of this article considers guidelines for 
fashioning and administering the- appropriate injunctive relief if 
foster care systems are to be made safe. 
lS3 Atwood, supra note 371, at 625-26. 
See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text. 
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VI. Guidelines for Effective Structural Injunctions 
Unfortunately, a precise recipe for success in obtaining 
implementation of complex injunctive decrees does not 
This is certainly true for foster care. There is only a single 
federal structural injunction dealing with safety in foster care: 
the order in G.L. v. Z ~ r n w a l t . ~ ~ ~  But G.L. is still in post-judg- 
ment litigation,388 so courts and lawyers confronting foster care 
right-to-safety cases do not have a completed record of other 
cases in the foster care field to draw upon. However, there are 
many mature structural injunctions in other, closely related, 
fields that present similar implementation questions.389 Impor- 
tant lessons emerge from the extensive experience in those cases 
about what the court and the parties involved in the case must 
do to increase the chances that a structural decree will be ef- 
fective. This section discusses five guidelines derived from those 
cases that, if followed, materially increase the probability of 
successfully implementing a structural injunction that protects 
the right to foster care safety while preserving the independence 
and integrity of the court. 
A. Continued Involvement of Plaintiffs' Counsel 
Institutional judgments are not self-executing. Child welfare 
agencies have been resistant to reform and, if the past is any 
guide, there is no reason to think that merely hortatory court 
386 Lowry, supra note 7, at 280. 
387 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983). See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
Under the terms of a supplemental consent decree, the court approved the 
establishment of an outside body composed of three persons to assist the parties' 
compliance with the decree. G.L. v. Zumwalt, Supplemental Consent Decree, at 2-7 
(July 29,1985). The Committee, as that body is called, currently is engaged in monitoring 
the decree. In addition, soon after the decree was entered, the state legislature passed 
a law establishing a state children's commission which, among other things, was spe- 
cifically charged with reporting to the legislature annually on compliance with the decree. 
H.B. 256, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 Mo. Laws 504. 
389 There is a growing literature, primarily in the form of case studies, on the effect 
of structural injunctions. See, e.g., Alpert, Prison Reform by Judicial Decree: The 
Unintended Consequences of Ruiz v. Estelle, 9 Just. Sys. J. 291 (1984); Champagne & 
Hass, The Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 275 
(1976); M. Hams & D. Spiller, supra note 299; Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8; 
Note, supra note 295; M. Rebel1 &A. Block, supra note 301; D. Rothman & S. Rothman, 
supra note 120, at 66-89. 
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orders will be treated more seriously than other calls for change 
that are almost always ignored. An institutional injunction case, 
therefore, cannot end at final judgment. Indeed, the victory that 
accompanies attainment of an institutional injunction must be 
seen by plaintiffs' counsel as only a way station on the road 
toward the achievement of the clients' goal. 
Several case studies of institutional reform litigation in 
other areas stress the importance of an active role for the plain- 
tiffs' counsel. David and Sheila Rothman in their study of the 
Willowbrook litigation, for example, identify the constant in- 
volvement of plaintiffs' counsel, whose "energies did not flag" 
over the decade or more of active post-judgment monitoring, as 
having contributed in a major way to the successful implemen- 
tation that was achieved in that case.390 An American Bar As- 
sociation study of compliance with court orders in prison reform 
cases made a similar observation when it commented that "[ilt 
is logical to conclude that compliance would not have occurred 
as quickly or in the ways that it did if plaintiffs' attorneys [in 
these cases] had not been monitoring actively."391 Thus, the first 
essential element to increase the probability of compliance with 
a structural injunction is the continuing involvement of plain- 
tiffs' attorney in the post-judgment proceedings.392 
B. A SpeciJic Decree 
The decree itself must be detailed and specific. It is not 
enough to declare that the plaintiff foster children have the right 
to be protected from harm; the court must specify what the 
foster care system must do to effectuate the right. A concrete 
decree focuses the parties and the court on the deficiencies in 
the system that caused the problem. Decrees should be quan- 
titative and precise and should provide specific tasks, possibly 
3W D. Rothman & S. Rothman, supra note 120, at 356-57. 
391 M. Hanis & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 396. 
392 Where the administration of the decree is left to the parties, the burden of 
reporting non-compliance usually falls on the plaintiff's attorney. Special Project, The 
Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 784,824 (1978). 
See also Note, supra note 295 at 1366, ("more active participation by the attorneys for 
the plaintiffs and amici might have compensated for some of the deficiencies of the . . . 
[monitor] that emerged during the implementation process"). 
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along with timetables for achieving them. If nonobjective stan- 
dards and goals are provided, intermediate, objective standards 
should also be outlined.393 G.L. is a model of this type of 
decree.394 
The G.L. decree dealt with fifteen different aspects of the 
problem, including caseworker case loads, foster parent com- 
pensation, medical and dental examinations, selection and su- 
pervision of foster homes, and investigations ~f suspected h- 
stances of foster parent abuse and neglect. For each topic, the 
decree provides standards for gauging the defendants' perfor- 
mance. For example, the defendants must maintain accurate 
medical records for each child including, at minimum, a com- 
plete medical history, all medical, dental and eye examinations, 
all inoculations and prescribed medication and indications as to 
when the next exam should occur.39S The decree does more than 
simply declare that foster homes be supervised regularly by 
trained caseworkers; it specifies a minimum acceptable fre- 
quency for the visits.3g6 
While a court must avoid excessive detail that will enmesh 
it in the minutiae of child care management,397 it is important 
that its order not be so general that it fails to provide effective 
relief. A decree that prescribes specific standards for the defen- 
dants to meet saves the court and the parties from later time- 
consuming and frustrating disputes about what constitutes com- 
pliance with the decree.398 A court formulating a decree has the 
opportunity to seek the input of the defendants. Since the decree 
is normally not issued until well after the initial determination 
393 Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 Mental 
Disability L. Rep. 69,74 (1976); Note, supra note 306, at 457. 
394 The district court in that case published the consent decree that it approved 
because of the "assistance this case may render other courts considering similar ques- 
tions." G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Publishing G.L. 
was an unusual but not unprecedented event. See, e.g., Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. 
- Supp. 395,396 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
39s G.L., 564 F. Supp. at 1038. 
396 G.L., 564 F. Supp. at 1034. 
397 CCf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1973) ("problems of prisons . . . 
[are] not readily susceptible of resolution by decree"). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 531 (1978); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 
(1976). 
3* Special Project, supra note 392, at 817-18 (addresses the advantages and dis- 
advantages of a detailed decree). 
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of liability, and since the defendants have the right to comment 
on it without prejudicing their right to appeal, there is no im- 
pediment to seeking their assistance.399 For the same reasons, 
the defendants have an incentive to come forward. Used wisely, 
the defendants' participation in the decree formulation process 
can be beneficial. By incorporating defendants' suggestions the 
court "encourages voluntarism" and "cooperative ap- 
pro ache^."^^^ It also becomes more fully informed about the 
practical consequences of its decree, and by encouraging the 
defendants' participation, it helps blunt the criticism that the 
judiciary lacks "relevant information"401 needed to formulate 
feasible remedies for systemic constitutional injuries. 
An additional and important benefit of a detailed decree is 
that it aids the court and parties in gauging the progress, or lack 
thereof toward compliance. The American Bar Association's 
study of prison cases revealed the practical significance of de- 
tailed structural decrees. The authors commented that the "clear 
and unambiguous" nature of a decree contribute[s] to compli- 
ance in that it gives "the plaintiffs' attorneys objective standards 
by which to measure failure to comply," and more importantly, 
it "contribute[s] to the belief (by defendants) that the judge [is] 
committed to achievement of compliance."402 
C.  The Need for Monitoring 
In addition to its substantive provisions, the decree must 
provide for monitoring the defendants' performance. Monitoring 
399 See, e.g., Taylor v. Board of Educ., 288 F.2d 600,604 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 940 (1961). 
For example, in Tatum v. Rogers, 75 Civ. 2782 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. February 20, 
1979) (available August 20, 1987 on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file), an action chal- 
lenging the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services maintenance and use 
of its computerized criminal history information system, the court, after finding that the 
plaintiff class's constitutional arguments were justified, directed the defendant agency 
to prepare a feasibility study to advise the court and plaintiffs' counsel how the vast 
defects in defendant's data base and procedures could be corrected. 
Lasker, supra note 290, at 79. Judge Lasker, who has presided over several 
significant structural decrees involving all the major pretrial detention facilities in New 
York City, concludes that this approach avoids "unnecessary intrusion" by the judiciary. 
Id. at 79. 
"1 Robertson, supra note 119, at 148. See also Note, supra note 306, at 439 (par- 
ticipation by the defendants can "enhance the likelihood of compliance with whatever 
standards are chosen"). 
M. Harris & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 189. 
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allows the court and the parties to determine the extent to which 
defendants have implemented the decreea403 Moreover, it forces 
the defendants to confront their obligation to change the system 
to comply with the decree. Unless defendants deliberately ab- 
dicate all responsibility, monitoring educates them about the 
system that they are responsible for running. 
There are several methods utilized by the courts to monitor 
decrees. One is for the court merely to retain jurisdiction, leav- 
ing plaintiffs' counsel solely responsible for monitoring. This 
method is generally coupled with provision for the plaintiffs' 
counsel to have access to the institutional records, documents 
and other relevant materials in the defendants' p o s s e ~ s i o n . ~ ~  In 
addition, most courts require the defendants to submit regular 
reports detailing the progress of implementat i~n.~~~ The general 
consensus is, however, that this alone is not an effective method 
of implementa t i~n .~~~ An example of the ineffectiveness of the 
method is Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Colum- 
bia.407 In Mills, the court ordered the Board of Education to 
provide suitable education for the handicapped. Over the next 
three years, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining com- 
plian~e.~O* As a result, the court, on motion of the plaintiffs, 
appointed a special master.409 A special master may have a broad 
range of power, including fact-finding, reporting and making 
recommendations, negotiating disputes between the parties, act- 
ing as an arbitrator, and in some cases, issuing orders binding 
the parties.410 Although controversial, the use of masters in 
Note, supra note 306, at 440; Special Project, supra note 392, at 824-37. 
This device has been used frequently as an adjunct to the retention of jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1042 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Lottman, supra 
note 393, at 69-70. 
The drawback of this device is that it depends on the "accuracy or completeness 
of information provided by administrators." Note, supra note 306, at 441. Reliability is 
often suspect because defendants may exaggerate compliance or base the reports on 
"inadequate record keeping systems." Id. at 442. 
Note, supra note 306, at 441. This method typically leaves enforcement up to 
an overworked plaintiffs' counsel whose lack of time and financial backing can hamper 
the enforcement effort. Lottman, supra note 393, at 70. 
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
Rebell, supra note 295, at 337-38. 
* Id. at 338. 
410 Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 Toledo L. 
Rev. 419, 421 (1979). Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) (quoting ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)). See 
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institutional reform cases has been considered "highly effective" 
by some  commentator^.^^^ 
A third method of monitoring used by the courts, and one 
somewhat less intrusive than a master, is the appointment of a 
monitor. In contrast to the role of a master, a monitor's powers 
are usually more limited. In a typical case the monitor serves 
as the court's "'eyes and ears' during the implementation pro- 
c e ~ s , " ~ ' ~  but is not vested with direct responsibility for imple- 
m e n t a t i ~ n . ~ ' ~  In Wyatt v. Stickney,414 a case involving the rights 
of the mentally ill and retarded in Alabama, Judge Frank John- 
son used this device when he appointed a Human Rights Com- 
mittee to oversee compliance. The committee was effective to 
the extent that two years after the order there had been a 
substantial improvement in safety, sanitation and habitability of 
the facility,415 but many other provisions of the order had not 
been successfully addressed.416 In the G.L. case, after attempts 
at monitoring by the plaintiffs' counsel proved unsuccessful, the 
court ordered the appointment of a blue ribbon commission with 
powers similar to the Human Rights Committee used by Judge 
J0hnson.~l7 Thus, while there continues to be much debate about 
which form of monitoring is most effective,418 and concrete 
recommendations in this area cannot be made reliably, there 
can be no debate that some method of examining defendants' 
conduct after entry of the decree is crucial. 
D. The Role of the District Judge 
The district judge must be actively involved to ensure suc- 
cessful implementation of a structural injunction. By relying 
getzerally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 452 
(1958). 
4~ Nathan, supra note 410, at 421; Special Project, supra note 392, at 835. 
Note, supra note 295, at 1360. 
Id. at 1361. 
414 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
4H Note, supra note 295, at 1378. 
Id. 
417 The Committee, a three-person body appointed by the parties, has been given a 
budget with which to hire a professional staff person. G.L. v. Zumwalt, Supplemental 
Consent Decree, at 2-7 (Filed July 29, 1985). 
41S See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 410, at 461-64; Special Project, supra note 392, 
at 809; Hams, Tlze Title VII Administrator, A Case Study in Judicial Flexibili~y, 60 
Cornell L. Rev. 53, 62-74 (1974). 
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upon counsel, and, if appropriate, court-appointed monitoring 
adjuncts, the court can avoid the appearance of administrative 
involvement, which has been criticized by opponents of struc- 
tural injunctions. Activity should not be confused with partisan- 
ship. The court need not shed the mantle of independence and 
become identified as a partisan " p o ~ e r b r o k e r " ~ ~ ~  in order to be 
effectively involved. The judge sits to resolve disputes among 
the parties in the post-judgment phase of litigation just as dis- 
passionately and objectively as prior to judgment. The key to 
success here is not that the judge identifies with one side or the 
other--of course, she should not-but that the court not end its 
involvement merely because a judgment has been entered. 
A clearly communicated willingness of the court to use its 
powers to enforce its decree is paramount. Without this, the 
natural reluctance of defendants to comply is reinforced. Of all 
the variables associated with institutional compliance with struc- 
tural injunctions, this is the one that appears to be predictive. 
A study of one of the major early prison condition cases, 
involving the entire Arkansas prison system, Holt v. Sa~er ,4~O 
concluded that transcending all other factors that influenced 
compliance was the "district court's expectation that defendants 
would comply with all of the court's order."421 By contrast, the 
study of Hamilton v. S ~ h i r o ~ ~ ~  by the same research team iden- 
tified the district judge's apparent satisfaction with the slow and 
incomplete efforts of the defendants to achieve compliance as a 
cause of the less than positive results achieved in that case.423 
If, despite the result of the trial, the judge does not appear to 
take the decree seriously, then neither will those responsible for 
its im~lementation.~~~ 
419 The pejorative term "powerbroker" was first used in this context in Diver, supra 
note 285. 
420 309 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
M. Harris & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 90. See also D. Rothman & S. 
Rothman, supra note 120, at 356 (attributing successful implementation of the Willow- 
brook litigation in large part to the efforts of the district judge). 
4U 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970). 
423 M. Hams & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 283. Failure of judicial involvement 
has been affirmatively linked to poor compliance results by others. See, e.g., Mnookin, 
In the Interest, supra note 8, at 351; Altman, Implementing a Civil Rights Injunction: 
A Case Study of NAACP v. Brennan, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 739,750-51 (describing how 
the "lack of judicial responsiveness" hindered enforcement of the decree). 
424 M. Hanis & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 27 (study concluded that the single 
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E. The Need for Flexibility 
Finally, the decree must be flexible enough so that unanti- 
cipated consequences can be dealt with through modification of 
its terms if necessary. Any attempt, whether judicial, legislative 
or executive, to reform an institution as complex as a modern 
social services bureaucracy is likely to produce unintended con- 
sequence~.~~ '  The decree in G.L. v. Zumwalt, for example, lim- 
ited the number of children permitted in any single foster home 
to because of concern that overcrowded foster homes 
were more likely to become centers of maltreatment than foster 
homes that were not overcrowded. While in the abstract this 
provision seems in practice it produced difficulty. 
Several excellent foster homes were caring for more than 
six G.L. class members when the decree was entered. In order 
to comply with the literal language of the decree, defendants 
would have had to remove children doing well in their homes. 
The disruption and anxiety caused these children would have 
outweighed any benefit that they might have gained from being 
sent to smaller foster families. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro- 
cedure provide a mechanism by which an injunction can be 
modified when it is not having its intended In G.L. this 
was not necessary, as plaintiffs' counsel agreed to permit the 
most important factor to a successful implementation effort was the judicial determi- 
nation to see that compliance was obtained). 
42-' Note, The Modifcation of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 
99 Haw. L. Rev. 1020, 1033 (1986). A structural injunction, like any significant orga- 
nizational change, often produces unintended results. Id. at 1034. See also Horowitz, 
supra note 291, at 1305. 
See also Wyatt v. Stickney. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (unintended consequences-boredom 
and anxiety among the patients-resulted when, in order to comply with the decree, 
the hospital was unable to allow the residents to work because it could not afford the 
compensation). 
426 G.L., 564 F. Supp. at 1036. 
427 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
428 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) & (6); C. Wright, supra note 332, at 661. As early as 
1932, Justice Cardozo stated that a "continuing decree of injunction directed to events 
to come" should be understood to be "subject always to adaptation as events may shape 
the need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). See also United 
States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953). Lower courts have continued to rely 
on Cardozo's principles. See, e.g., Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(en banc). See also Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modifcation of Injunctions 
in tlte Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1986). 
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children to remain in these homes providing that no others were 
sent to them until they had shrunk, by attrition, to the required 
size.429 The court and parties need always be ready to modify 
the decree to avoid detrimental, unintended consequences.430 
These guidelines are, of course, general. They do not begin 
to answer the many specific questions that any serious effort at 
implementation of a right-to-safety decree will present.431 They 
do serve, however, to identify at least the major tasks that must 
be attended to if implementation is to be achieved. If these tasks 
are undertaken, given the record of effectiveness obtained for 
structural decrees in other settings, there is reason to be hopeful 
that a federal court can achieve its function of assuring that the 
constitutional right to safety is provided to foster children. 
Conclusion 
The time has come to recognize that foster children have a 
right to safety while in foster care. Foster care is intended to 
be a temporary refuge for children whose parents cannot care 
for them. But in practice, more often than has been acknowl- 
edged by many observers, foster care is not safe. Abuse and 
neglect of foster children occur at levels that far exceed in 
quantity and magnitude what a reasonably run system of care 
should produce. State-countenanced mistreatment of innocent 
children has serious ramifications for society. The infliction of 
harm on children who have suffered the trauma of parental 
default retards or even eliminates their potential for normal 
development. However, the political process has proven to be 
ineffective in alleviating this problem. Foster children, drawn 
largely from the disadvantaged and from minority groups, sim- 
429 See Letter from plaintiffs' counsel to defendants dated February 3, 1984, at 4 
(on file with author). 
430 Examples of court-ordered modifications of structural injunctions include New 
York State Ass'n For Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), 
modification denied, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 
F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973), modified, 429 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1977). For a 
criticism of the over-eagerness of some courts to modii  decrees when implementation 
becomes difficult, see Shapiro, The Modification of Equitable Decrees: A Critical Com- 
mentary, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 459 (1984). 
431 See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text. 
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ply do not have access or influence to move the executive or 
legislative branches of government to increase the funding 
needed to bring about change. As a practical matter, the courts 
must become involved if foster care is to function as it is 
intended. 
The basis for judicial involvement is clear. The right to 
safety has deep roots in American jurisprudential thought. Dur- 
ing the past two decades, federal courts have developed and 
implemented the right for every group of persons held under 
state custody other than foster children. Ironically, foster chil- 
dren are the one group with the most to gain from recognition 
of this fundamental right. 
This article demonstrates that it is not possible to construct 
a logical distinction between foster children and other groups 
that have been afforded the benefits of the right to safety. To 
make the right to safety effective, a court must be able to fashion 
prospective relief with the flexibility to take into account the 
wide range of factors that can stimulate the organizational 
change needed. Experience with right-to-safety cases for other 
groups shows that only the structural injunction provides the 
court with these tools. Federal courts have historically served 
as the forum for the protection of citizens' constitutional rights 
from abridgement by the state. Therefore, they are the preferred 
forum for foster care right-to-safety cases. Reform of foster care 
will not come easily or quickly. But, if the guidelines offered in 
this article for courts and parties are followed, experience from 
other structural injunction cases demonstrates that federal 
courts have it in their power to make foster care, at last, the 
haven it was always intended to be. 
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